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I. INTRODUCTION 
Market definition is an essential part of antitrust law. When 
companies are penalized for their behavior, it is because their actions 
restrict competition within a certain market. The delineation of that 
market has important consequences for companies, affecting whether 
they are dominant, or whether their agreements are deemed anti-
competitive. Google, the world’s biggest search provider, is 
experiencing this first-hand: the European Commission ordered it to 
pay a staggering fine of 2.42 billion euro for abusing its dominant 
position in the “general search market.”1 But this market definition 
has been a source of criticism, as it disregards key features of the 
industry in which Google operates.2 Internet businesses have specific 
traits, which render the application of existing principles of market 
definition more complicated: expanded geographical boundaries, 
decreased marginal costs, multi-sided markets and network effects. 
Market definition is particularly challenging when online services 
offer some of their products for free. As the traditional tools of market 
definition rely heavily on price, the question arises how to define 
“market” for these in the absence of a monetary price. This challenge 
arises world-wide: many jurisdictions adopt variations of a price-
based test (like the SSNIP3 test) to define markets and assess market 
power.4  
 
 
 
 
1 Press Release, European Comm’n, Antitrust: Commission fines Google €2.42 billion for 
abusing dominance as search engine by giving illegal advantage to own comparison 
shopping service (June 27, 2017), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-
1784_en.htm [https://perma.cc/LRR7-7UER]. 
2 James D. Ratliff & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Is There a Market for Organic Search Engine 
Results and Can Their Manipulation Give Rise to Antitrust Liability?, 10(3) J. 
COMPETITION L. AND ECON. 517, 518 (2014); Florence Thépot, Market Power in Online 
Search and Social Networking: A Matter of Two-Sided Markets, 36(2) WORLD 
COMPETITION 195, 196 (2013). 
3 ‘Small but significant non-transitory increase in price’. 
4 INT’L COMPETITION NETWORK, REPORT ON MERGER GUIDELINES, Market Definition, ch. 2, 
at 4 (2004), 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc562.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D3BH-5QTQ](hereinafter ‘ICN Guidelines’); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION AND DEV. [OECD], POLICY ROUNDTABLE ON MARKET DEFINITION 11 (2012), 
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Trying to fit free online services into traditional price-based tests 
may seem like attempting to square a circle: if no money is exchanged, 
no price is paid, and a market cannot be defined. To overcome this 
challenge, this article rethinks the idea of price. It explores the 
possibility of conceptualizing personal data as the price consumers 
pay for free online services, for the purpose of market definition. 'Data 
is the currency of the 21st Century' has become a catchphrase, invoking 
a futuristic image of consumers wielding ‘personal data’ credit cards at 
every cash register. Although personal data is not (and will probably 
never be) the common currency of modern society, that notion may 
not be as far-fetched as it sounds. Consumers routinely act as the 
providers of an important input of businesses of the digital economy: 
personal data. In return for providing this input they obtain access to 
services for which they would otherwise pay a monetary fee. As the 
collection of personal data becomes more common and consumer 
awareness grows, the sensitivity of consumers to the amount of 
personal data demanded could increase. As a result, consumers who 
feel they are not getting value for their money, or more accurately 
'value for their personal data' may switch to other services. In that 
case, personal data as a price could be used as a measure of demand-
side substitutability, and thus as a part of market definition. 
Two jurisdictions have inspired this article: The United States and 
the European Union. Not only have both jurisdictions adopted the 
SSNIP test as part of market definition, but the U.S. and the EU are 
also closely linked: consumers and businesses on the Internet 
increasingly interact, regardless of geographical barriers between the 
U.S. and Europe. The recent Google case illustrates this: an American 
Internet company is the subject of scrutiny in Europe for objections 
which were dismissed in America. The growth of the Internet means 
that these two jurisdictions will increasingly be fighting comparable 
battles. Market definition will need to be performed for similar 
companies in a similar environment on both sides of the Atlantic. 
The structure of this article is as follows. The first part introduces 
the issues explored in this article. The second part analyzes the notion 
of ‘free’, as well as its challenges for competition law practice. It also 
explores the concept of market definition, its basic concepts and 
application, as well as its shortcomings. The third part evaluates the 
notion of personal data as price, beginning with a definition of 
                                                                                                                   
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Marketdefinition2012.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5E64-LJ3F]. 
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Tradable Personal Data (“TPD”) and a definition of price as a certain 
amount demanded of a medium of exchange. It continues by setting 
out the requirements which personal data needs to satisfy to be a 
medium of exchange. Specific attention is given to the requirements of 
acceptability and value, as these appear the most difficult to fulfill 
regarding personal data. The fourth part discusses the 
implementation of personal data as price into the hypothetical 
monopolist test. All of this leads to the conclusion that despite the 
current imperfection of personal data as price, it is an interesting 
alternative to market definition in markets where no monetary price 
exists. This article aims to demonstrate that rapid changes in society 
need not be an obstacle to legal decision-making. With the necessary 
flexibility and creativity, traditional tools can become modern 
solutions. 
II. THE NOTION OF “FREE” AND MARKET DEFINITION 
A. “Free” on the Internet 
Google, Amazon, Facebook, Twitter and YouTube… Everyone 
knows these names and what they stand for. The companies who own 
these websites have almost become synonymous with the Internet. 
They provide search, social networking and video streaming services; 
they enable increased access to information; they connect those who 
would have found it hard to find each other in the ‘offline’ world. They 
have opened what seems like endless possibilities for many in the 21st 
Century. And what is more, these services are completely free! Or, at 
least, that is how it seems. No money exchanges hands, no credit card 
details are provided. This lack of price has baffled authorities around 
the world for quite some time, with some courts arguing that there 
cannot be a market if there is no price.  
Yet, the companies offering these services are not charities, they 
are out to make a profit. A monetary price may not be exchanged, but 
something else is: users of the service may provide ‘attention’ to 
advertising or provide their personal data.5 The type of ‘free’ service 
 
 
 
 
5 Michael S. Gal & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, The Hidden Costs of Free Goods: Implication for 
Antitrust Enforcement, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 521, 527 (2016); Chris Jay Hoofnagle & Jan 
Whittington, Free: Accounting for the Costs of the Internet’s Most Popular Price, 61 UCLA 
L. REV. 606, 608 &626 (2014); John Newman, Antitrust in Zero-Price Markets, 164 U. PA. 
L. REV, 165 (2015); CHRIS ANDERSON, FREE: THE FUTURE OF A RADICAL PRICE, 12, 20 
(Hyperion Books 2009). 
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which is offered to consumers in order to generate advertising revenue 
is not exclusive to the online world. It was, and to some extent still is, 
prevalent in traditional media such as television broadcasting.6 There 
is no monetary exchange between content provider and consumer, but 
there is an economic exchange: consumers provide access to 
themselves.7 In the words of Newman, users literally ‘pay’ attention to 
advertising, thus signaling the existence of a market in which an 
exchange takes place.8 Examples include Google Search, which offers 
users access to its search engine at no monetary cost, but subjects 
users to targeted advertisement, or Amazon, which started offering its 
advertising-supported Kindle Fire Tablets at a discount. Consumers 
also frequently give up their personal data for the use of services. As 
Lanier puts it, “it has become commonplace to expect online services 
to be given for free, or rather, in exchange for acquiescence to be spied 
on.”9 Some price comparison sites, for example, collect and resell 
consumers’ personal data in exchange for the use of their sites.10 It can 
be argued that services are not truly ‘free’ when they are provided in 
exchange for something. The provision of free goods and services 
raises some interesting issues for competition law practice. 
Traditional tools were designed around competition on price, an easy 
factor to quantify.11 When a product is free, the price dimension that 
 
 
 
 
6 C. Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What It Wants, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 311, 319 (1997); 
Ellen P. Goodman, Media Policy Out of the Box: Content Abundance, Attention Scarcity, 
and the Failures of Digital Markets, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1389, 1424 (2004); Jean J. 
Gabszewicz et al., Media as Multi-Sided Platform, in HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF 
THE MEDIA 8 (Robert G. Picard & Steven S. Wildman eds., 2015). 
7 EUROPE ECON., MARKET DEFINITION IN THE MEDIA SECTOR – ECONOMIC ISSUES – REPORT 
FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DG COMPETITION 44 (2002), 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/media/documents/european_economics.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VVA8-UZ6H]. 
8 Newman, supra note 5, at 171. 
9 JARON LANIER, WHO OWNS THE FUTURE? 10 (Simon & Schuster, 2013).  
10 BEAT THAT QUOTE, http://www.beatthatquote.com/ [https://perma.cc/E9A5-HUGK]; 
See Sean Poulter, Beware the Company Websites that are Selling on your Personal 
Details, DAILY MAIL (Apr. 8, 2011), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
1375066/Beware-company-websites-selling-personal-details.html 
[https://perma.cc/C975-SXFV]. 
11 Gal & Rubinfeld, supra note 5, at 30; Fabio Polverino, Hunting the Wild Geese: 
Competition Analysis in a World of ‘Free’, Concorrenza e Mercato 545, 548 (2012). 
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authorities have come to rely on falls away.12 It has been argued that if 
there is no price, there can be no abuse: a zero price means that there 
are no monopoly overcharges and thus no harm to consumers.13 Yet it 
is important to realize that not all zero-priced products are actually 
‘free’: when consumers provide something in return, they do provide a 
‘payment’, in attention or in personal data. When consumers incur 
such costs, this is a signal that a market exists.14 Companies offering 
‘free’ goods have risen to prominence in the recent past, forcing a 
rethinking of the price theory in which market definition is rooted.15  
B. The Use of Market Definition 
Market definition is a universal tool, adopted in many jurisdictions 
to determine the boundaries within which to assess market power and 
the effects on competition.16 U.S.17 and EU18 authorities consistently 
 
 
 
 
12 Aleksandra Gebicka & Andreas Heinemann, Social Media and Competition Law, 37 
WORLD COMPETITION 149, 154 (2014); Miguel Sousa Ferro, “Ceci n’est pas un marché”: 
Gratuity and Competition Law, 1 CONCURRENCES 1, 3 (2015); David Stallibrass & Sharon 
Pang, Clash of Titans: How China Disciplines Internet Markets, 6 J. EUR. COMPETITION L. 
& PRAC. 418, 419 (2015). 
13 Ferro, supra note 12, at 4; Robert H. Bork, Antitrust and Google, HUDSON INST. (Apr. 6, 
2012), http://hudson.org/research/8861-antitrust-and-google [https://perma.cc/2V7W-
UQ2K]; Nathan Newman, Search, Antitrust and the Economics of the Control of User 
Data, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 401, 412 (2014); Kinderstart.com, LLC v Google, Inc., No. C 06-
2057 JF (RS), 2007 WL 831806 (N.D. Ca. Mar. 16, 2007). 
14 Newman, supra note 13, at 420. 
15 Id. at 446; Polverino, supra note 11, at 3; Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, No 
Mistake about It: The Important Role of Antitrust in the Era of Big Data, in THE 
ANTITRUST SOURCE, UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER SERIES 5 
(2015); Thépot, supra note 2, at 216. 
16 OECD, supra note 4, at 21. 
17 United States v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 593 (1956); See United 
States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271 (1964); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE AND FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 7 (2010), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2010/08/19/hmg-2010.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2QL9-KAGB] (hereinafter ‘DOJ & FTC Merger Guidelines’). 
18 Case 27/76, United Brands Co. & United Brands Continental BV v. Comm’n, [1978] ECR 
207, §10; Case 31/80, L’Oreal v. De Nieuwe AMCK, [1980] ECR 3775, §25; Case 62/86, 
AKZO Chemie BV v. Comm’n, [1991] ECR I-3359, §51; Case T-62/98, Volkswagen v. 
Comm’n, [2000] ECR II-2707, § 230; Case T-65/96, Kish Glass & CO Ltd v. Comm’n, 
[2001] ECR II-1885, §62; Eur. Comm’n, Notice on the Definition of Relevant Market for 
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acknowledge it as a critical tool in competition law assessments, 
allowing for the identification of primary competitive constraints. 
Defining a relevant market involves the delineation of two 
dimensions:19 the geographic market and the product market.20 This 
article focuses on the product market, which consists of those goods or 
services that compete to satisfy consumers’ needs. The question that is 
asked when determining the product market is whether goods or 
services are interchangeable (“substitutable”) from the point of view of 
consumers (and sometimes, from the point of view of suppliers).21 To 
put it in economic terms, the product market is found through an 
assessment of demand-side substitutability.22 Demand-side 
substitutability is particularly important due to the substantial 
competitive constraint that arises from consumers who are prepared 
to switch to other products. The possibility of demand-side 
substitutability cautions an undertaking not to increase the price 
because it is unlikely that the increase would be profitable. If the price 
of a product goes up, consumers switch to alternatives that they 
consider substitutes, thus causing a loss in sales because the decrease 
in output offsets the increase in unit price margin.23  
                                                                                                                   
Purposes of Community Competition Law, OJ C 372, 9.12.1997, p. 5 (hereinafter ‘EU 
Comm. Notice Market Definition’). 
19 In some cases, authorities take into account a third dimension, the temporal market, 
when time has a specific effect on the market, such as in the case of season specific fruit, 
for example. We will not address this dimension here. 
20 RICHARD WHISH & DAVID BAILEY, COMPETITION LAW 30 (OUP, 7th ed. 2012); ROBERT 
O’DONOGHUE & JORGE PADILLA, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF ARTICLE 102 TFEU 95 (Hart 
Publishing, 2d ed. 2013); SIMON BISHOP & MIKE WALKER, THE ECONOMICS OF EC 
COMPETITION LAW: CONCEPTS, APPLICATION, AND MEASUREMENT 113 (Sweet & Mawell, 3d 
ed. 2010). 
21 DOJ & FTC Merger Guidelines, supra note 17, at 7; United States v. E.I. Du Pont de 
Nemours and Co., 351 U.S. at 395 (1956); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 
at 276–77 (1964); EU Comm. Notice Market Definition, supra note 18, at §7; Case 6/72, 
Europemballage Co. & Continental Can Co. v. Comm’n of the Eur. Communities, [1973] 
Common Mkt. L. Rep. I99, §32; Case 27/76 United Brands Co. and United Brands 
Continental BV v. Comm’n, [1978] ECR at §22. 
22 EU Comm. Notice Market Definition, supra note 18, at §14; Jonathan B. Baker, Market 
Definition: An Analytical Overview, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 129, 134 (2007). 
23 WHISH & BAILEY, supra note 20, at 31; O’DONOGHUE & PADILLA, supra note 20, at 100; 
BISHOP & WALKER, supra note 20, at 118. 
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Demand-side substitutability has been conceptualized through the 
Hypothetical Monopolist Test (“HMT”), developed in the U.S. by the 
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission.24 It has 
been widely accepted throughout various jurisdictions, including the 
EU, where it has become part of the Notice on Market Definition.25 
Under the HMT, a market consists of a good or service, or a group of 
goods or services, on which a hypothetical undertaking (both the 
present and future seller, wishing to maximize its profits and not 
subject to price regulations) could impose a significant and lasting 
price increase. It seeks to determine the narrowest market on which a 
hypothetical monopolist could exercise its market power. Thus, the 
relevant market is the smallest market worth monopolizing.26 The 
most direct implementation of this concept is the SSNIP test, which 
stands for ‘Small but Significant Non-Transitory Increase in Price’. It 
reformulates the concept of the HMT into a test, by asking the 
following: ‘If the undertaking in question were to introduce a SSNIP, 
would customers switch to other products or services in a manner that 
makes the price increase unprofitable?’ The SSNIP test broadly 
consists of four steps. First the candidate market will be determined, 
which essentially consists of the products or services offered by the 
undertaking in question. Second, it will be assessed whether a SSNIP 
will induce consumers to switch to such an extent that the increase 
becomes unprofitable. If it does not, the test will end here; this is the 
relevant market. If it does, the third step will be to broaden the market 
to include those ‘next-best substitutes’ the consumers have switched 
to. The final step is to repeat the whole process.27 These four steps 
amount to a study of demand-side substitutability.  
The second of these steps – the assessment of whether it is 
profitable to apply a SSNIP – requires more clarification. First, an 
 
 
 
 
24 BISHOP & WALKER, supra note 20, at 111; Malcolm B. Coate & Jeffrey H. Fischer, A 
Practical Guide to the Hypothetical Monopolist Test for Market Definition, 4 J. 
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 1031, 1035 (2008); DOJ & FTC Merger Guidelines, supra note 17, 
at 8. 
25 Safinaz Mohd Hussein et al., Market Definition and Market Power as Tools for the 
Assessment of Competition, 13 INT’L J. BUS. &  SOC’Y 163, 171 (2012). 
26 O’DONOGHUE & PADILLA, supra note 20, at 108; BISHOP & WALKER, supra note 20, at 
111; Coate & Fischer, supra note 24, at 1035. 
27 O’DONOGHUE & PADILLA, supra note 20, at 110; WHISH & BAILEY, supra note 20, at 31; 
Coate & Fischer, supra note 24, at 1036. 
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increase in price is considered small but significant if it is a 5 to 10% 
increase.28 Second, the increase should be non-transitory and thus 
permanent, or at least stable, for a significant period of time. Lastly, 
assessing whether a SSNIP would be profitable requires empirical 
data. It may be that past occurrences have illustrated that such an 
increase would or would not be profitable. Previous shocks in the 
market due to entry or exit, changes in output, quality, marketing 
policy, or costs, may illustrate this sufficiently after discarding 
external factors. This is what Coate and Fischer call the use of “natural 
experiments.”29 Another way of assessing the profitability of a price 
increase is the “critical loss analysis.”30 The critical loss is the loss of 
sales that would result in a SSNIP having no net effect on profits. If 
the actual loss of sales resulting from the SSNIP is greater than the 
critical loss, the price increase is unprofitable. Put differently, the 
SSNIP is unprofitable if customers desert to substitutes to such an 
extent that the increase in the profit margin per unit sold does not 
make up for the loss of output in total.31 As the market is broadened to 
include more demand substitutes, a point will eventually be reached at 
which a hypothetical monopolist could impose a SSNIP because there 
are no longer enough demand substitutes to which consumers could 
turn. There would no longer be other products constraining the 
hypothetical monopolist from increasing its price. This is the end of 
the assessment: the relevant market has been found.32 
 
 
 
 
28 BISHOP & WALKER, supra note 20, at 115; O’DONOGHUE & PADILLA, supra note 20, at 110; 
WHISH & BAILEY, supra note 20, at 32; E.U. Comm’n Notice Mkt. Definition, supra note 
18, at §17; DOJ & FTC Merger Guidelines, supra note 17, at 10 (guidelines do caution that 
what constitutes a small but significant increase may vary depending on the specific 
industry and thus even fall below 5%). 
29 Coate & Fischer, supra note 24, at 1044. 
30 O’DONOGHUE & PADILLA, supra note 2020, at 111; David S. Evans, Lightening Up on 
Market Definition, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF ANTITRUST LAW 53, 70 
(Einer Elhauge 2012); Baker, supra note 22, at 154; Coate & Fischer, supra note 24, at 
1040. Cases with Critical Loss Analysis: FTC v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., (1986-1) Trade 
Cas. ¶67,071 (D.D.C. 1986) at 62-513; FTC v. Swedish Match, 131 F.Supp. 2d 151, 161–62 
(D.D.C. 2000). 
31 There is a trade-off: the price-cost margins increase to those customers who continue to 
purchase from the undertaking, but the undertaking loses the entire price-cost margin it 
would previously have received from those customers who are now buying elsewhere. 
Baker, supra note 22, at 142. 
32 BISHOP & WALKER, supra note 20, at 116; Coate & Fischer, supra note 24, at 1040; 
O’DONOGHUE & PADILLA, supra note 20, at 111. 
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C. The Problem of Price 
A summary glance at the market definition tests immediately 
reveals a problem: the tests require the existence of a price. Yet, many 
online services are offered to users for “free.” How can a market be 
defined through consumers’ reactions to price increases if there is no 
price?33 Authorities and scholars have argued that competition law 
cannot be applied to zero-price products; without a price there can be 
no market, no market power, and no anticompetitive effects.34 In the 
KinderStart case, an American court declared that antitrust law does 
not “concern itself with competition in the provision of free services” 
and that Google or any other search provider does not “sell its search 
services.”35 The validity of this can be disputed. An important part of 
services on the Internet are offered for free, by undertakings who run 
profitable businesses. “Free” should not always be taken to mean “for 
nothing.” In some business models the user is asked to provide 
something in return for the service, such as personal data, which the 
undertaking can monetize.36 Furthermore, competition has not 
disappeared merely because the undertakings offer their product for 
“free.” Antitrust enforcement – and thus market definition – remains 
possible. If no monetary price is charged, it is necessary to find 
alternatives to the traditional application of the SSNIP test to define 
the market.37  
 
 
 
 
33 Sondergutachten 68: Wettbewerbspolitik: Herausforderung digitale Märkte (Special 
Report No. 68: Competition Policy: The Challenge of Digital Markets), June 1, 2015, 
MONOPOLKOMMISION at ¶ 59 (Ger.). 
34 Ferro, supra note 12, at ¶14; Newman, supra note 5, at 161; Stucke & Grunes, supra note 
15, at 6; Jared Kagan, Bricks, Mortar, and Google: Defining the Relevant Antitrust Market 
for Internet-Based Companies, 55 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 271, 277 (2010); Nicolo Zingales, 
Product Market Definition in Online Search and Advertising, 9 COMPETITION L. REV. 29, 
33 (2013). 
35 Kinderstart.com LLC v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-3057 JF(RS), 2007 WL 831806 at *5 
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007). 
36 Graef, supra note 13, at 474; Newman, supra note 5, at 152, 165. 
37 Some suggestions have included the replacement of price by quality, thus measuring not 
a SSNIP but a SSNDQ (small but significant non-transitory decrease in quality), Gebicka & 
Heinemann, supra note 12, at 156; or the integration of two-sided market analysis into the 
market definition, trying to find a common measurement for the prices on both sides. 
Zingales, supra note 34, at 33.  
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This article puts forward such an alternative and begs the reader 
to consider that consumers do pay a price for services: the price of 
personal data. Conceptualizing personal data as a “price” would 
enable the assessment of demand-side substitutability by determining 
whether consumers are sensitive to increases in the personal data 
collected, thereby inducing them to switch to other products they 
consider substitutes. This analysis can be performed through the 
SSNIP test, by fitting “personal data as price” within the confines of 
the test. In order for personal data to be a price for the purposes of the 
SSNIP test, it is necessary to define what is meant by price and 
whether personal data fulfills this definition. In assessing these 
definitions, it is essential to remember the scope of this thought 
experiment: the feasibility of personal data as a “price” for the purpose 
of assessing demand-side substitutability. This requires a micro-view 
of consumers and their potential approach to personal data in B2C 
(Business-to-Consumer) relationships. A macro-analysis of the role of 
data in all economic relationships is beyond the scope of this article. 
III. PERSONAL DATA AS PRICE 
A. Introduction and Definitions 
The definition of “free” in the dictionary is that something does 
not “cost anything” or comes free of ““charge.”38 Although seemingly 
straightforward, this definition is ambiguous. The common 
assumption is that “free” signifies something that is received without 
the need for financial payment, but this need not be so. A “charge” or a 
“cost” can refer to an “amount of money” or to “something given to get 
a particular thing.”39 When someone tells you that an online service 
can be used ““for free,” it may be worth asking, “what kind of free do 
 
 
 
 
38 Free, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/free 
[https://perma.cc/P88B-VL83]; Free, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES, 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/free [https://perma.cc/7VVS-HM37]. 
39 Charge, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, 
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/charge [https://perma.cc/JU4R-
UZF5]; Cost, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, 
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/cost [https://perma.cc/5R6Q-MPL8]; 
Charge, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES, 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/charge [https://perma.cc/C35S-SHGJ]; 
Cost, OXFORD LIVING DICTIONARIES, https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/cost 
[https://perma.cc/C2GY-4ZMB]. 
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you mean?” Often, online services do not require money, and so call 
themselves “free,” while at the same time collecting personal data on 
its users. It can be argued, although no money changes hands, that a 
price is being paid: personal data is that price. This argument is the 
premise on which the following thought experiment is based. Thus, 
attention to the concrete meaning of this hypothesis is warranted, 
with particular consideration of the understanding of the concepts 
“personal data” and “price.” 
Personal data is widely defined as any information relating to an 
identified person (i.e. distinguishable as an individual from other 
members of a group, or an identifiable natural person).40 This 
information may relate to an individual in several ways, making him 
directly or indirectly identifiable. The category “indirectly” refers to 
information which may not directly reveal the identity of the data 
subject, but allows for his identification by combination with other 
 
 
 
 
40 EU: Article 2(a) of Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31; Article 2(a) of Regulation 45/2001 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free 
movement of such data, 2001 O.J. (L 8) 1; Article 4 of Regulation 2016/679 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of natural persons with regard 
to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 
1 (effective May 25, 2018) (hereinafter GDPR); Article 3 of Directive 2016/680 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council on the protection of natural persons with regard 
to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the 
prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of 
criminal penalties, and on the free movement of such data, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 89 (to be 
transposed by EU Member States by May 6, 2018); Opinion of the Article 29 Data 
Protection Authority Working Party on the Concept of Personal Data, 2007 4/2007, 7. 
U.S. data protection laws do not use a similar definition; however, the U.S. Code contains 
references to the identifiability of the individual (the term ‘‘record’’ means any item, 
collection, or grouping of information about an individual that is maintained by an agency, 
including, but not limited to, his education, financial transactions, medical history, and 
criminal or employment history and that contains his name, or the identifying number, 
symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual, such as a finger or voice 
print or a photograph, Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, § 3, 88 Stat. 1896, 1897 
(1974)(emphasis added); the California Online Privacy Protection Act defines “personally 
identifiable information” as “individually identifiable information about an individual 
consumer collected online by the operator from that individual and maintained by the 
operator in an accessible form,” (Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 22577(a)(1)–(7); and the 
California Government Code identifies ‘electronically collected personal information’ as 
“any information that is maintained by an agency that identifies or describes an individual 
user.” Cal. Gov. Code § 11015.5(d)(1).  
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pieces of information.41 The OECD specifically lists the following 
categories of personal data: 
• User generated content (blogs, comments, photos, videos);  
• Social data (contacts on social networks);  
• Activity or behavioral data (search terms, browsing history, 
purchases…);  
• Locational data (including IP address);  
• Demographic data (age, gender, sexual orientation, political 
affiliation, ethnicity…); and 
• Official identifying data (such as names, ID or social security 
numbers, credit card information…).42 
This definition is broad, purposely so, as it has been used to 
capture many types of information under data protection regulation.43 
Although it may be a useful definition in that context, it lacks 
specificity for the purpose of this thought experiment, as it includes 
information that is collected without commercial purpose. The focus 
of this analysis is on personal data which can be part of an exchange 
between a seller, or service provider, and a user, and which can be 
monetized by the seller. This type of information will be called 
“tradable personal data” (TPD) throughout this article. This definition 
is similar, but narrower, than the one proposed by Dinev and Hart, 
who define personal information as “the type of information necessary 
to conduct an online transaction.” Their definition includes any 
information necessary to purchase goods or services or to register at 
websites (i.e. information which acts as a means to facilitate some 
interaction), whereas this article's definition focuses on the benefit 
one party wants to obtain in an exchange, as the objective itself of the 
transaction.44  
 
 
 
 
41 Opinion of the Article 29 Data Protection Authority Working Party on the Concept of 
Personal Data, supra note 40, at 13. 
42 Org. for Econ. Co-Operation and Dev. [OECD], Exploring the Economics of Personal 
Data: A Survey of Methodologies for Measuring Monetary Value, DSTI/ICCP/IE/REG 
(2011) 2/FINAL 8 (2013). 
43 Note that the U.S. has a different approach and the definition coming closest to this 
definition can be found in the VPPA. Paul M. Schwartz & Daniel J. Solove, Defining 
Personal Data, 13 PRIVACY AND SEC. L. REP. 1581 (2014). 
44 Tamara Dinev & Paul Hart, An Extended Privacy Calculus Model for E-Commerce 
Transactions, 17 J. INFO. SYS. RES. 61, 63 (2006). 
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The second concept in need of a definition is the notion of “price.” 
This term – “price” – is routinely used in a wide range of settings: 
from conversations between private individuals to policy debates and 
academic theoretical discourse. In most situations its meaning is 
taken for granted, as it is clear from the context in which the term is 
used. Generally, it is used to describe some form of payment: 
something that has to be “given up” to receive something else.45 
Consumers use the word price to mean the “cost” of obtaining what 
they want. They enter into a transaction with another entity, which 
provides something they want, and give something in return. Price, 
thus, involves a notion of “quid pro quo:” giving X (the price) to 
receive Y (the good or service). This is what is called, in common law 
of contracts, “consideration:” the reciprocity that makes a contract 
legally binding, when each party to a contract is both promisor and 
promisee of something of value.46 Consideration does not require 
money per se. Barter, or the exchange of goods or services for other 
goods or services, falls within its ambit.47  
In Gottlieb v. Tropicana, an American court held that, despite the 
lack of monetary price, there had been sufficient consideration for a 
contract to be established. This case specifically concerned the 
exchange of personal information for a service. The facts revolved 
around the offer of a Diamond Club card at a casino, which entitled 
the holder to spin a wheel of fortune, the Million Dollar Wheel, once a 
day. To obtain the Diamond Club card a customer had to submit 
personal data, which would be used for targeted marketing. In the 
case, a Diamond Club card holder had spun the wheel and won the 
grand prize, which the casino refused to pay out. The casino claimed 
before the court that, inter alia, there was no valid contract because 
there was insufficient consideration. The court disagreed, holding that 
“[b]y presenting her Diamond Club card to the casino attendant and 
allowing it to be swiped into the casino's machine, she was permitting 
the casino to gather information about her gambling habits.”48 The 
 
 
 
 
45 Donald RUTHERFORD, ECONOMICS: THE KEY CONCEPTS 159 (Routledge Key Guides 2007). 
46 EMILY FINCH & STEFAN FAFINSKI, LAWEXPRESS: CONTRACT LAW 36 (Pearson, 3d ed. 
2013). 
47 RUTHERFORD, supra note 45, at 159. 
48 Gottlieb v. Tropicana Hotel & Casino, 109 F. Supp. 2d 324, 329 (E.D. Pa. 2000) 
(emphasis added). 
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idea implicit in the reasoning of the Gottlieb court is that things other 
than the promise of money can constitute consideration. This holds 
true for price in general, as well. 
The idea of “quid pro quo,” or consideration, can form the basis 
for a definition of the concept of price. A price is a tool of 
communication, a way for buyers and sellers to express their 
intentions, to signal that they value what the other has to offer, and to 
indicate how much they are willing to give in exchange. Price is 
broadly speaking the amount of money or something of worth that 
has to be sacrificed to obtain one unit of a good or service.49 Although 
prices are customarily expressed in terms of money, they can be 
rendered in terms of other goods or services. Although not expressed 
in this way by the court, this was the case in Gottlieb v. Tropicana; the 
price had been rendered in ‘swipes’ and in personal information - the 
swipe of the Club Card to spin the wheel, personal information to 
obtain the Club Card. Price, in other words, is the amount of a 
medium of exchange which needs to be paid to obtain a good or 
service. A medium of exchange is the object which, although it may 
have little intrinsic value, is widely used and accepted to pay for goods 
or services. People will readily accept it, even if they do not need it for 
itself, because they know they can use it to purchase other goods or 
services.50 The object occupies a particular position in the economy, 
acting as a sort of “go-between.”51 Without it, trade would be more 
difficult, as the exchange of goods would require a double coincidence 
of wants.52  
The definition of price, then, can be formulated as follows: price is 
the amount of something of worth that has to be exchanged to obtain 
 
 
 
 
49 RUTHERFORD, supra note 45, at 159; Irena Asmundson, Back to Basics: What Is a Price? 
50 FIN. & DEV. 42 (2013). 
50 Nobuhiro Kiyotaki & Randall Wright, Acceptability, Means of Payment, and Media of 
Exchange, in FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS QUARTERLY REVIEW 18 (Summer 
1992); Robert A. Jones, The Origin and Development of Media of Exchange, 84 J. POL. 
ECON. 757, 758 (1976). 
51 W. T. NEWLYN, THEORY OF MONEY 1 (Oxford University Press 1971); Geoffrey Ingham, 
‘Babylonian Madness’: On the Historical and Sociological Origins of Money, in 1 
THEORIES OF MONEY AND BANKING: DEVELOPMENT OF HETERODOX APPROACHES TO MONEY 
AND BANKING 82 (Elgar Research Collection 2000). 
52 NEWLYN, supra note 51, at 53; WILLIAM STANLEY JEVONS, MONEY AND THE MECHANISM 
OF EXCHANGE 13 (K. Paul, Trench, & Co. 1909); JOSEPH HARRIS, AN ESSAY UPON MONEY 
AND COINS. PART I. THE THEORIES OF COMMERCE, MONEY, AND EXCHANGES 36 (1757). 
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one unit of a good or service, i.e. price is an agreed amount of a 
medium of exchange. This means that personal data could be used as 
a price, if it can be a medium of exchange. Although many items could 
be used as a medium of exchange (past media of exchange have 
included cattle, shells, stones, corn, cacao nuts, tobacco, salt, and so 
on) in practice one article will be selected by custom or by force of 
circumstances. Money is our current medium of exchange – the set of 
assets in the economy regularly used to buy goods – in addition to 
being our unit of account, store of value and standard of deferred 
payment.53 This is unlikely to change any time soon. However, it can 
be argued that in a particular subset of the economy – the online 
business models centered on the offer of free goods for profit – 
personal data may come to fulfill that function. Whether an item has 
the potential to be a medium of exchange is interesting for multiple 
areas of academic and policy debate, ranging from the macro-
economic views of currencies and prices, to the regulation of 
relationships between people at a micro-level. This article does not 
mean to get involved in those debates, however fascinating they may 
be. What is of concern, for the purposes of this analysis, is the way in 
which this definition of price (as an amount of a medium of exchange) 
can assist with market definition. Market definition involves an 
assessment of demand-side substitution. The use of media of 
exchange (the payment of prices) indicates the willingness of 
individuals to trade, and the value they attribute to goods and services 
relative to each other. Because their access to the medium of exchange 
fluctuates, individuals distribute it according to their own preferences 
and priorities. They will use less of the medium for products of lesser 
value to them, and more of the medium for products of higher value. 
Thus, the attribution of media of exchange in the economy – the 
“prices paid” – reflects demand. 
In general, eight different requirements need to be fulfilled for an 
item to be an “ideal” medium of exchange, although not all historical 
media of exchange have fulfilled every one. These requirements are: 
value, acceptability, relative durability and stability, portability, 
 
 
 
 
53 N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 612 (CENGAGE Learning, 7th ed. 
2015); CHARLES A. CONANT, THE PRINCIPLES OF MONEY AND BANKING 20 (Harper & Bro. 
1905); Iulia Bucur & Stefan Sambotin, On Money as an Institution and Medium of 
Exchange, 16–17 STUD. & SCI. RES. ECON. ED. 37, 38 (2011-2012); JEVONS, supra note 52, 
at 13; NEWLYN, supra note 51, at 2; HARRIS, supra note 52, at 37; Ingham, supra note 51, at 
82. 
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divisibility, storability, recognizability and homogeneity.54 Two 
caveats need to be made regarding these requirements. First, it is 
important to remember that these requirements are the criteria for an 
“ideal” medium of exchange. Money itself does not fulfill all of these 
perfectly at all times. Even items that do not satisfy all of these 
requirements can be media of exchange, as long as they are valued by 
trade participants and accepted by them in exchange for goods and 
services. The fulfillment of these two requirements – value and 
acceptability – is essential for any item to function as a medium of 
exchange. Second, the threshold for the fulfillment of these 
requirements may vary depending on the ultimate use of the item. If 
the medium of exchange is to be used as a currency for the wider 
economy, or as an investment vehicle, the item may have to satisfy the 
criteria to a higher degree, and in the eyes of more trade participants, 
than in the context at hand. In this article, the concept of personal 
data as a medium of exchange is approached for the purpose of being 
a measure of demand-side substitutability. The most important 
requirements, therefore, are value and acceptability, to be fulfilled 
from the perspective of the consumers of the services for which 
personal data is exchanged. Users of an online service should attribute 
a certain value to their data, and accept that their data is provided in 
exchange for goods or services. If they do, their purchasing actions can 
reveal their opinion on the extent that products fulfill their needs and 
wants. By “spending” less personal data on one service, but more on 
another, they signal their preferences for certain products. If 
consumers value personal data, and accept it as a means of exchange, 
their consumption patterns would reveal which products they 
consider to be substitutes. Personal data would be the price they pay, 
and a way to measure demand-side substitutability. Value and 
acceptability will be discussed in more detail in the following sections. 
B. Value 
1. Value in Theory 
In order for an item to be a medium of exchange, it needs to have a 
recognized value. Without the existence of this value in the minds of 
those exchanging in trade, the item will not readily be accepted as a 
 
 
 
 
54 CONANT, supra note 53; JEVONS, supra note 52; NEWLYN, supra note 51; HARRIS, supra 
note 52, at 39; JONES, supra note 50; Kiyotaki & Wright, supra note 50, at 18-19. 
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medium of exchange. The medium can derive its value from different 
sources: the value can be intrinsic, meaning that it corresponds to the 
independent value of the good it is composed of; the value may be 
external, because it is a consequence of the item’s relationship to other 
goods; or it can purely be a result of social convention.55 TPD can only 
be used as a medium of exchange if it has value, whether it is intrinsic, 
external, a result of social convention, or a combination of all of these. 
It may be worth examining whether there are any reasons TPD could 
have value in the minds of the persons engaging in commerce online. 
The intrinsic value of a medium of exchange is often a result of the 
scarcity or the utility of its composing object. In some cases, it can also 
be the result of the cost of parting with it. In the first case, the medium 
of exchange is valuable because the item itself is finite and highly 
desired.56 The composing good is in limited supply, and in high 
demand. It should not be too scarce, however, as it has to exist in 
sufficient quantity to meet the needs of trade.57 Scarcity does not need 
to be universal: it may be that an object is scarce in one place, but not 
in another. The high cost or difficulty involved in transporting the 
object from one place (where the object can be found in abundance) to 
another (where it cannot or can hardly be found) can make it scarce in 
the last place and give it value. The value can also be a consequence of 
the cost involved in the collection, production, or reproduction of the 
medium.58 Extensive labor input can give the medium value. A 
modern example of a medium which acquires value because of the 
labor required is the digital currency Bitcoin, which needs to be 
‘mined’59 by individuals.60 An earlier example is the sea shells which 
were used as media of exchange in the East Indies and by Native 
American Tribes,61 and had to be collected, sorted, polished and 
 
 
 
 
55 JEVONS, supra note 52, at 9, 11; CONANT, supra note 53, at 71. 
56 HARRIS, supra note 52, at 41, 45. 
57 HARRIS, supra note 52, at 78; JEVONS, supra note 53, at 49. 
58 HARRIS, supra note 52, at 42. 
59 “Mining” refers to the process of running mathematical hash verification processes to 
generate bitcoins and to validate Bitcoin transactions, thus ensuring the security of the 
Bitcoin ledge. 
60 Nikolei Kaplanov, Nerdy Money: Bitcoin, the Private Digital Currency, and the Case 
against its Regulation, 25 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 111, 119-21 (2012). 
61 JEVONS, supra note 52, at 24. 
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assembled on string. The second cause of intrinsic value lies in the 
utility of the composing object. The extent a commodity gratifies a 
need or desire determines its value to members of society.62 An 
object’s use may be ornamental, which was the case for shell beads 
which were used for ornamental purposes by Native American tribes 
and later adopted as media of exchange. Commodities with a 
particular use, such as input or consumption goods, have also been 
used as media of exchange in the past, deriving their value from their 
use purely as a commodity and their utility as a medium of 
exchange.63 The last cause of intrinsic value is the cost of parting with 
a medium. This cost may be tangible or intangible. 
It is possible to argue that TPD has intrinsic value. This intrinsic 
value is unlikely to lie in the scarcity of TPD. Personal data may be in 
high demand, but in principle the supply of personal data is not 
limited, in so far as the technical means and regulatory framework 
enable its collection. The amount of times an individual can give the 
same personal information is generally not limited, as personal data is 
a non-rivalrous good. Although effort is required in the development 
of technology for its collection and storage, the reproduction of 
personal data is no exorbitant cost. The utility of data may be a partial 
source of its value. It is used as an input for consumer services, 
targeted advertising, analytical services, and other applications being 
developed in the digital economy. Although scarcity and utility can 
provide theoretical explanations for the intrinsic value of data from 
the point of view of the businesses who collect it, personal data needs 
to be valued by users as well. Only then can it be a medium of 
exchange and a measure of demand-side substitutability. The cost of 
parting with personal data could explain the value of personal data to 
users, as sharing personal data entails privacy and opportunity costs. 
Sharing personal information involves some loss of privacy, and the 
knowledge that companies may possess information about you which 
they will put to use. Additionally, although an individual could give 
the same information to multiple entities, in some cases data may be 
the most valuable the first time it is shared. Therefore, sharing it 
comes with the opportunity cost of not being able to reveal it for the 
first time to another company.  
 
 
 
 
62 JEVONS, supra note 52, at 9-10. 
63 JEVONS, supra note 52, at 42. 
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Regardless of its intrinsic value, a medium of exchange’s value 
may be external, or a result of social convention. The relationship to 
other goods, such as gold, may attribute external value to a coin or 
piece of paper, which it does not intrinsically possess. The external 
goods guarantee the value of the medium, often strengthened by social 
convention. Habit, custom or legal enactment may attribute value to a 
medium of exchange, without reference to the properties of the 
medium or to another good. The intrinsic value of a good may still 
matter but is not necessary: an object can derive its value solely from 
the social agreement.64 The force of the social convention as an 
assignor of value coincides with the quality of acceptability described 
below. The acceptance and use of an object as something with value by 
members of the society enforces the notion that it has a purpose and 
thus value. 
2. Value in Practice 
Asserting the causes of a medium’s value is an interesting 
theoretical exercise. The real valuation of data, however, requires a 
more practical approach. Several methods can be used to determine 
the value of personal data. Unsurprisingly, each of these methods has 
its drawbacks. Studies on the value of data are fairly recent, and the 
research on the topic is still in its infancy. The economic use of 
personal data is a growing business with a lot more room for research. 
As the business grows, the literature on the topic is supplemented 
with additional research. Based on this research, there are three ways 
to approach the valuation question: studies can assess the value from 
the point of view of businesses, from the point of view of the users or 
‘data subjects’, or from the point of view of an exchange between 
businesses and users. Two categories of valuation methods will be 
discussed: first, business-to-business (B2B) market-based 
assessments and second, valuations that incorporate the data subject. 
All methods have their pros and cons and still require refinement. 
Their existence, however, shows that it is indeed possible to attribute a 
value to personal data. The ideal valuation would consist of a 
combination of these different rudimentary methods. 
The first category of valuation methods consists of business-based 
assessments, which determine the value of personal data solely on 
 
 
 
 
64 Xavier Cuadras-Morato, Can Ice Cream Be Money?: Perishable Medium of Exchange, 
66 J. ECON. 103, 105 (1997). 
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information from corporate activities which do not directly involve the 
data subject, the consumer. The use of personal data by companies is 
thriving and growing. This is illustrated by the development of the 
field of infonomics, which is the study of the economic significance of 
information. The term was coined by Douglas Laney, and this field of 
research recognizes the potential of information as a business asset 
and studied how to quantify information’s value.65 As the corporate 
use of personal data grows, so does the interest in the value of data. 
Broadly, three groups of valuation methods will be discussed: 
valuations on the basis of company performance, valuations based on 
the cost of data loss or data replacement, and the market price of 
personal data. The first two groups of methods are based on 
indications of individual companies, whereas the valuation of personal 
data based on its market price refers to business-to-business relations.  
The valuations based on company performance can look at either 
key performance indicators, or at the economic value of a personal 
data asset. The first option entails running experiments to compare 
how a company performs on one or more performance indicators 
including the use of personal data, with how the company performs on 
those indicators without the use of data.66 The second option evaluates 
the contribution of data assets to the revenue of an organization. The 
aggregated market capitalization (total market value of the shares), 
revenue or net income of the company is divided by the number of 
personal data records held, to determine the value of each record.67 
 
 
 
 
65 Douglas Laney, Introducing Infonomics: Valuing Information as a Corporate Asset, 
GARTNER RES. (2012), https://www.gartner.com/doc/1958016?refval=andpcp=mpe 
[https://perma.cc/ZE42-TZ5H]; Daniel Moody & Peter Walsh, Measuring the Value of 
Information: An Asset Valuation Approach, Presented at the European Conference on 
Information Systems 2 (1999), http://si.deis.unical.it/zumpano/2004-
2005/PSI/lezione2/ValueOfInformation.pdf [https://perma.cc/2S7W-TDZC]. 
66 Nicole Laskowski, Six Ways to Measure the Value of your Information Assets, in CIO 
DECISIONS: THE NEW INFONOMICS REALITY: DETERMINING THE VALUE OF DATA (SearchCIO 
TechTarget 2014), http://searchcio.techtarget.com/feature/Six-ways-to-measure-the-
value-of-your-information-assets [https://perma.cc/K4RW-DJTS] (based on Douglas 
Laney, Why and How to Measure the Value of your Information Assets, GARTNER RES. 
(2015), https://www.gartner.com/doc/3106719/measure-value-information-assets); 
Bilyana Petkova & Philipp Hacker, Reining in the Big Promise of Big Data: Transparency, 
Inequality, and New Regulatory Frontiers, 13 LECTURE & OTHER AFFILIATE SCHOLARSHIP 
SERIES 19 (2016). 
67 OECD, supra note 42, at 20; Laskowski, supra note 66 (based on Laney, supra note 66); 
Petkova & Hacker, supra note 66, at 20. 
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Revenue can come from multiple sources, such as the use of data for 
targeted advertising68 or the sale of analytical services. This method, 
however, relies on the concept that every record is comparable. In 
addition, it is a reliable method only if most of the company’s revenue 
is generated through the use of personal data or if the data-driven part 
of the company’s activities is split into a clearly separate and distinct 
part of the company. This method requires information on the 
company, which may not always be public knowledge. Most of the 
available information used to this date comes from U.S. companies. 
The OECD, for example, analyzed the U.S. figures of data broker 
Experian and of social network site Facebook in its 2011 report. The 
concept of valuations based on the cost of data if it needs to be 
replaced is best illustrated by the loss of data in case of a security 
breach. Such a loss will imply multiple costs, such as the risk of 
damages claimed by customers, but also the cost of replacing the 
data.69 This cost value of information has been set out by Laney, based 
on the accounting principles of replacement costs, used for most 
intangible assets that do not have a discernible market value.70 The 
last approach to business-based valuations tries to determine the 
market value of personal data, by assessing the revenue generated 
from the sale, license, or barter of personal data. It determines the 
price in competitive markets, which is, in principle, the market 
clearing price at the intersection of supply and demand. As personal 
data is non-rivalrous (use does not diminish the supply), the market 
clearing price may not fully coincide with the full economic value of 
the underlying personal data record. In addition, the market clearing 
price may also include other elements such as the costs incurred by 
the company in the collection and management of the data.71 
However, for the purposes of market definition, it seems that the 
market clearing price is a sensible determinant of personal data’s 
value. A bigger problem with the reliance on market prices is that the 
information available on market prices refers to B2B relations, such as 
sales by data brokers or by companies, such as Facebook or Twitter, to 
third parties. For a more comprehensive understanding of the value of 
 
 
 
 
68 Method used by Petkova & Hacker, supra note 66. 
69 OECD, supra note 42, at 20-29. 
70 Laskowski, supra note 66 (based on Laney, supra note 66); OECD, supra note 42, at 25. 
71 OECD, supra note 42, at 25. 
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personal data, it is necessary to introduce the consumer side into the 
equation. 
Valuations that incorporate the data subject are vital to the use of 
personal data as a price for the definition of the market with regard to 
‘free’ services on the Internet. These services are part of B2C 
(business-to-consumer) relationships in which personal data is the 
price paid by consumers, the data subjects. Only taking into account 
the value of personal data for a company’s activities, or the value 
within the B2B relationships, would not be appropriate. Information 
on the value that data subjects attribute to their personal data is less 
readily available than information on the value attributed by 
businesses. This does not mean, however, that no methods exist to 
approximate such an evaluation. Over time the interest in the 
valuation of personal data by individuals has grown and the literature 
on the subject has expanded. Surveys and experiments have been 
done on the individual valuation of specific personal data records by 
consumers, as well as on their willingness to pay for privacy and 
willingness to accept money for personal data. This research reveals 
that a value can be assigned to personal data by individuals, which 
often varies depending on the types of personal data.72 It also revealed 
that the amount of consumers willing to accept money in exchange for 
their personal data is generally greater than the number of consumers 
willing to pay the same price for the protection against disclosure of 
this information.73 These differences between willingness to pay for 
privacy (WTP) and willingness to accept money for personal data 
(WTA) illustrate that WTP alone may not be the most accurate 
method for determining the valuation of personal data by individual 
consumers. Moreover, surveys and experiments have clear downsides. 
Surveys reveal stated preferences, which, as illustrated by the privacy 
paradox, may not coincide with reality. Experiments have the 
drawback that the context and framing of the experiment can have a 
 
 
 
 
72 Bernardo A. Huberman, Eytan Adar & Leslie R. Fine, Valuating Privacy, 3 IEEE 
SECURITY & PRIVACY, Sept-Oct. 2005, at 22, 22 (2005); Jens Grossklags & Alessandro 
Acquisti, When 25 Cents is Too Much: An Experiment on Willingness-To-Sell and 
Willingness-To-Protect Personal Information, SIXTH WORKSHOP ON THE ECONOMICS OF 
INFORMATION SECURITY 16, 29 (2007). 
73 OECD, supra note 42, at 30; Alessandro Acquisti, Leslie K. John & George Loewenstein, 
What is Privacy Worth? 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 249 (2013); Grossklags & Acquisti, supra note 
72; Christine Bauer, Jana Korunovska & Sarah Spiekermann, On the Value of Information 
– What Facebook Users are Willing to Pay, Proceedings of the European Conference on 
Information Systems Paper 197, at 3 (2012). 
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decisive impact on participants’ decisions, thus skewing the results. 
These disadvantages should not be construed as a reason to 
discontinue further research into the valuation of personal data by 
consumers, especially if experiments can be set up in such a way as to 
more closely resemble real-life scenarios of the exchange of personal 
data for monetary benefits. Consumers routinely encounter situations 
in which they exchange personal data for a benefit, such as for a free 
service or discounted good. These scenarios can be used as points of 
reference for the valuation of personal data by consumers. 
Nonetheless, results from such experiments would not suffice on its 
own, as it may not reveal the actual value consumers can obtain for 
their personal data in relation to a company.74 Another, potentially 
more appropriate, method of assigning user-based value to personal 
data is to perform a market analysis which includes the data subject. A 
market approach captures an economic value resulting from the 
intersection of supply and demand.75 As of yet, the direct sale, license 
or barter of personal data is mostly done in B2B relations, but markets 
where individuals trade their own data are developing, as described 
below.76 Companies like Datacoup or People.io offer consumers the 
possibility to exchange their personal data for monetary benefits, such 
as money, offers by third parties, or credits. The offer of credits in 
exchange for the personal data may not sound wholly new: even 
before the advent of digital markets, consumers received credits (or 
‘points’) when using certain loyalty or ‘frequent shopper’ cards which 
record data about their shopping behavior.77 The modern schemes 
take this a step further, by making the exchange of personal data for 
credits more explicit, and clearly articulating how many credits one 
obtains in exchange for the personal data. A study of these businesses 
could provide valuable insights into the value of personal data. When 
trying to ascertain the value of TPD, it could be instructive to establish 
the amount of credits individuals get in these schemes for their 
 
 
 
 
74 OECD, supra note 42, at 32. 
75 OECD, supra note 42, at 32. 
76 See C.3. Acceptability: Data Markets and Other Shifts to TPD. 
77 Timothy R. Graeff & Susan Harmon, Collecting and Using Personal Data: Consumers’ 
Awareness and Concerns, 19 J. CONSUMER MARKETING 302, 304 (2002); Nils Zurawski, 
Local Practice and Global Data: Loyalty Cards, Social Practices, and Consumer 
Surveillance, 52 SOCIOLOGICAL Q. 509, 510 (2011); Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 72, at 
29. 
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personal data and what it is they can buy with their credits. Let’s 
assume that information on the phone brand a consumer uses is 
worth 10 credits.78 If 100 credits equals a $5 discount in an online 
store, then one personal data record, in this instance the information 
on the consumer’s phone brand, is worth $0.50. To be able to posit, 
with some degree of certainty, that such a valuation is representative 
of the B2C market in data trade would require information from 
multiple data locker services, which at present is lacking. These 
nascent services could improve the process of valuation of personal 
data, as they incorporate both the demand side and the supply side in 
the B2C relationship. It will be interesting to see how they develop and 
whether more such business models emerge.79 
 
 
 
 
 
78 Which it seems to be on the People.io website – People.io offers 10 credits for an answer 
to certain questions when you first start using the website. People.io are not yet active in 
Yorkshire, but they are in London, however. It is not clear what the exchange rate of credits 
is. 
79 OECD, supra note 42, at 34. 
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Each of the methods described above suffers from the novelty of 
personal data as an asset and as a medium of exchange. It is important 
to acknowledge that, without more research and practical evidence on 
the value of data, the use of TPD as price for the purposes of market 
definition would not be feasible. This article continues on the 
assumption that it is possible to value TPD, and that future studies 
and business practice will contribute to enabling B2C and B2B 
valuations. From the perspective of companies, the research on 
valuations of data by companies as part of their intangible assets is 
scarce, but growing, as more and more companies collect and sell 
data. As this industry expands, so does the demand for proper 
valuation methods which overcome some of the current problems with 
the transposition of current accounting methods.80 From the 
perspective of consumers, there is yet more work to be done, as the 
development of B2C data trade is younger and less developed. Thus, 
there remains many opportunities for research into the business-to-
consumer valuation of personal data, in particular with regard to a 
potential market price for personal data. However, as more companies 
venture into the sale, license or barter of personal data from consumer 
to business, practical evidence and expertise increases, allowing for a 
better idea of the B2C value of personal data. This is essential to 
establish personal data as a medium of exchange in the future.  
C. Acceptability 
A key requirement for an object to be a medium of exchange is 
that it is accepted as such by the members of the economy in which it 
is used. This means that its position as a ‘go-between’ is acknowledged 
or capable of being accepted by a majority of the individuals in that 
community. Acceptability may be the result of social convention, the 
force of circumstances or custom, or it may be imposed from higher 
up. An item might be accepted as a medium of exchange only in part 
of a society – a ‘sub’ community or economy – as is the case with 
Bitcoin, as long as members of that economy or community are aware, 
and accepting, of its use. In order for TPD to be a medium of exchange 
in a subset of the digital economy, it is necessary for it to be widely 
 
 
 
 
80 Juergen Sidgman & Malcolm Crompton, Valuing Personal Data to Foster Privacy: A 
Thought Experiment and Opportunities for Research, 30 J. INFO. SYS. 169 (2016); Adam 
B. Thimmesch, Transacting in Data: Tax, Privacy, and the New Economy, 94 DENV. L. 
REV. 145, 173 (2016). 
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accepted as such in the relationship between businesses and 
consumers. The difficulty lies not with the businesses, who routinely 
engage in a trade of data,81 but with consumers. Acceptability requires 
that consumers are aware of its use and are willing to treat it as 
medium in a trade relationship. Two elements of consumers’ current 
and future attitude to TPD will be discussed briefly: their awareness of 
data collection and use, and their willingness to exchange personal 
data for benefits. 
1. Awareness 
It is paramount that a certain degree of awareness exists for the 
argument that TPD may be (or may become) a medium of exchange, 
and a measure of demand-side substitutability. Consumers need to be 
aware of three things: 1) the phenomenon of data collection itself and 
the circumstances in which it takes place, 2) the types of information 
collected and their use, and 3) the fact that the collection happens in 
exchange for benefits.  
First, consumer awareness of data collection is an important 
element within the relationship between a data subject and a 
commercial entity. It seems that consumers are increasingly conscious 
of the regular collection of data by companies.82 Around 80% of the 
survey respondents in Deloitte’s 2013 report reported awareness of 
the existence of data collection, and the subsequent report in 2014 
stated that these numbers were increasing.83 Respondents to the U.K. 
 
 
 
 
81 UK Competition & Markets Authority, The Commercial Use of Consumer Data: Report 
on the CMA’s Call for Information 34 (2015), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/435817/
The_commercial_use_of_consumer_data.pdf [https://perma.cc/V53A-P7MR] 
[hereinafter CMA]. 
82 Consumer Focus survey cited in CMA, supra note 81, at 98, n. 111 (98% of consumers 
think that some personal data and information is collected by ‘free’ services); JAMIE 
BARTLETT, THE DATA DIALOGUE 14, 34 (Demos Report 2012), 
http://www.demos.co.uk/files/The_Data_Dialogue.pdf?1347544233 
[https://perma.cc/5LRU-RXMZ] [hereinafter Demos Report] (85% aware that online 
purchasing history data collected and used). 
83 HARVEY LEWIS, CECILIA LIAO & NEHA PANDEY, DATA NATION 2013: BALANCING GROWTH 
AND RESPONSIBILITY 1 (Deloitte Insight 2013), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/deloitte-
analytics/data-nation-2013-balancing-growth-and-responsibility.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/KW3E-XVGD] [hereinafter Deloitte 2013]; HARVEY LEWIS & CECILIA 
LIAO, DATA NATION 2014: PUTTING CUSTOMERS FIRST 3 (Deloitte Insight 2014), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/contentconten 
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Competition and Markets Authority’s (CMA) call for information 
proposed that awareness was high due to companies’ frequent privacy 
notices, terms and conditions, and cookie bars (informing consumers 
of cookies on the website).84 This might indicate that mandatory 
information obligations do indeed serve a purpose: that of making 
consumers conscious of the phenomenon of data collection. 
Nonetheless, although consumers know that data collection is a 
reality, they are less aware of how and when data is being collected. 
Information duties may increase awareness of the phenomenon itself, 
but they manage to increase awareness of the methods and 
circumstances only to a limited extent. Privacy policies are often 
vague, and assessing them is time-consuming.85 According to 
Deloitte’s 2013 report, it would take an individual 31 hours to read the 
privacy policies of all new websites they visit in a year.86 Agreements 
on the collection personal data are often incomplete or (intentionally) 
opaque, lacking details on the use of the data (including transfers to 
third parties).87 Although consumers are conscious of the collection of 
data in general, the specific means of collection, usage, and storage are 
far less engrained. Of the 80% of consumers who were aware of data 
collection in general, only 35% claimed to understand it “fully,” 
whereas 45% said they did not know the details.88 There is a notable 
                                                                                                                   
tcontent/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/deloitte-analytics/deloitte-uk-data-nation-
2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QU9-EEZU] [hereinafter Deloitte 2014]. 
84 CMA, supra note 81, at 99. 
85 Carlos Jensen & Colin Potts, Privacy Policies as Decision-Making Tools: An Evaluation 
of Online Privacy Notices, 6 Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in 
Computing Systems, ACM PRESS 471 (2004); Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, 
Beliefs and Behaviors: Internet Users’ Understanding of Behavioral Understanding, 
Presentation at the TPRC2010 Conference 41 (2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1989092 
[https://perma.cc/N8VW-RYDJ]; Alessandro Acquisti, Curtis R. Taylor & Liad Wagman, 
54 J. ECON. LIT. 442, 479 (2016). 
86 Deloitte 2013, supra note 83, at 6; David B. Meinert et al., Privacy Policy Statements 
and Consumer Willingness to Provide Personal Information, 4 J. ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 
IN ORGANIZATIONS 1, 13 (2006) (while respondents were generally aware of privacy policy 
statements, most do not take the time to read them).  
87 Alastair R. Beresford et al., Unwillingness to Pay for Privacy: A Field Experiment, 117 
ECON. LETTERS 25, 25 (2012); Tony Vila et al., Why We Can’t Be Bothered to Read Privacy 
Policies: Models of Privacy Economics as a Lemons Market, in PROC. IN 5 INT’L CONF. ON 
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 1, 2 (2003). 
88 Deloitte 2013, supra note 83, at 1. 
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difference between awareness of active data collection and awareness 
of passive collection. Active data collection implies the direct 
solicitation of information from the consumer, which happens, for 
example, when a consumer fills in a form or survey. Consumers are 
aware of active data collection.89 Passive data collection, such as 
cookies tracking the websites visited or purchasing habits, is less 
obvious. The degree of consumer knowledge varies depending on the 
method concerned.90 For example, only a small number of consumers 
(21%) surveyed by Hoofnagle et al. were unaware of the existence of 
cookies,91 but as companies frequently develop new techniques to 
collect data, consumers have a hard time keeping up.92 In their 2010 
article, McDonald and Cranor summarized this problem in one 
sentence: “[our] lab study quickly disabused us of any idea of studying 
user perceptions’ of some of these techniques.”93 
Second, awareness of the types of information being collected, and 
of the actual use of this information, requires examination. 
Consumers expect that services will collect a wide range of data.94 It 
would seem sensible, then, to assume that consumers would read 
privacy policies, and, thus, would know which type of information 
they divulge. However, many of these policies describe broad 
categories of information—such as “personal information”—or give a 
list of data without describing exactly when they are being collected.95 
 
 
 
 
89 DANIEL CAMERON ET AL., IPSOS MORI: SOCIAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE, DIALOGUE ON DATA: 
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91 Chris Jay Hoofnagle et al., How Different Are Young Adults from Older Adults When It 
Comes to Information Privacy Attitudes and Policies? 13 (2010), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1589864 [https://perma.cc/TB5V-NC6Q]. 
92 Hoofnagle et al., supra note 90, at 277-83; Acquisti et al., supra note 85, at 25. 
93 McDonald & Cranor, supra note 85, at 7. 
94 CMA, supra note 81, at 99 (revealed that 70% of users of ‘free services’ expected these 
services to collect search history, sites visited, ‘likes’, location and purchases.)  
95 E.g., Privacy Policy, GOOGLE, www.google.com/policies/privacy/ 
[https://perma.cc/Y5PS-ZNUU]; Privacy Notice, AMAZON, 
https://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref=gss?nodeId=502584 
[https://perma.cc/W27A-YM7H] (last modified July 6, 2017), Data Policy, FACEBOOK, 
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Even if they were more specific, many consumers do not even read the 
privacy policies of the companies they interact with. Thus, the 
awareness of the types of data collected remains limited. When it 
comes to actual usage of data, consumer knowledge varies. 
Advertising and marketing purposes are the most commonly cited 
examples of data use. According to a 2014 survey by the Royal 
Statistical Society (RSS), 77% of respondents are aware that targeted 
advertisement is based on previous browsing data.96 Although 
advertising and marketing are currently the most important example 
of data usage for purposes other than the improvement of the service, 
companies could also sell, share, or license data for other purposes, 
which are not widely understood and not always specifically 
communicated to the consumers. Awareness of the types of 
information collected, as well as the uses, could increase as 
companies’ policies come under scrutiny through media coverage or 
regulatory intervention. Currently, “transparency” and data protection 
is very in vogue.97 If discussion and intervention continue, it seems 
likely that consumer knowledge of data collection will increase. 
Lastly, it is important to know whether consumers realize that the 
services they use are not “free,” but part of an exchange of benefits. 
The CMA call for information98 revealed that respondents are 
increasingly thinking of being part of a “mutual value exchange.”99 
Some of the benefits that were cited by the consumers and businesses 
responding to the call were: personalized offers and discounts, 
product improvement, and free access to services, which would likely 
charge money for use if they could not generate revenue through the 
                                                                                                                   
https://www.facebook.com/policy.php# [https://perma.cc/4B63-D2D9] (last modified 
Sept. 29, 2016). 
96 IPSOS MORI SOC. RESEARCH INSTITUTE, PUBLIC ATTITUDES TO THE USE AND SHARING OF 
THEIR DATA 21 (2014). 
97 Emma Cradock et al., Nobody Puts Data in a Corner? Why a New Approach to 
Categorising Personal Data is Required for the Obligation to Inform, 33 COMP. L. & SEC. 
REV. 142, 142 (2017). 
98 CMA, supra note 81, at 17 (Carried out in January 2015 throughout UK amongst 
consumers, consumer representatives, individual firms and their representatives, trade 
bodies, research/academic organizations and others, including infomediaries. The Call for 
Information was supplemented with information from factual reviews commissioned from 
DotEcon and Analysis Mason.). 
99 Id. at 102; Demos Report, supra note 82, at 14. 
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trade of data.100 There is evidence that the public is generally not 
willing to pay for free services (in money).101 Although a “trust deficit,” 
as described by the RSS,102 may make consumers wary of data 
sharing,103 it seems they are increasingly conscious of the use of data 
for purposes, which may be beneficial to them. However, this 
knowledge is the result of media coverage rather than of an actual 
exchange of information between companies and consumers. If the 
provision of personal information is to be an actual trade, consumers 
should know in more detail, at the time of exchange, which benefits 
they may expect in return for their TPD. Transparency on the 
collection and use of information is vital to create an environment of 
mutual benefit and exchange. As articulated in the Demos report, “At 
the moment people are entering into an exchange but are not always 
sure what they are trading. It is vital to make the currency of the 
exchange more explicit to all parties, so that trust is established.”104 
Some CMA respondents suggested that awareness would rise with 
ongoing growth in more explicit data-driven services.105 This may 
indeed contribute to an environment in which the exchange of 
personal information is seen as an explicit trade. Indeed, 
organizations are emerging which focus on the benefits individuals 
can obtain from the trading of their personal data. These are discussed 
below.  
2. Willingness 
The second question is whether consumers would be willing to 
exchange TPD for economic benefits. That businesses derive value 
from data and engage in data trades is well-known, but how do 
 
 
 
 
100 CMA, supra note 81, at 54, 59. 
101 Id. at 103. 
102 IPSOS MORI, supra note 96, at 9; See THE ECONOMIST: INTELLIGENCE UNIT, THE 
BUSINESS OF DATA 15 (2015) (“It’s a question of trust”). 
103 CMA, supra note 81, at 103 (Consumers seem to consider that the benefit they receive in 
exchange for their data is by far exceeded by the benefit companies derive from the use of 
their data.). 
104 Demos Report, supra note 82, at 18. 
105 CMA, supra note 81, at 100; Demos Report, supra note 82, at 40; DIRECT MARKETING 
ASSOCIATION, DATA PRIVACY: WHAT THE CONSUMER REALLY THINKS 10-12 (2012). 
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consumers approach the personal data trade? The disclosure of TPD is 
likely to generate trade-offs with tangible economic dimensions.106 
Individuals will disclose TPD only if they perceive that the overall 
benefits of disclosure are at least balanced by, if not greater than, the 
assessed risk of disclosure.107 These efficient bargaining arguments 
depend on consumers internalizing the costs and benefits of trading 
their personal information.108 This implies a calculation of the costs 
and benefits involved in the disclosure of TPD. One can ask, however, 
whether such a calculation is indeed possible. 
A calculus of expected returns may be impeded by the lack of 
(perfect) information on the use of the personal data. In addition, 
even if a consumer were aware of every possible usage of that 
information, bounded rationality and optimism bias mean individuals 
may hyperbolically discount future costs and benefits. Individuals 
appear to be more inclined to reveal information if the immediate 
gratification from this revelation seems or is superior to the delayed 
(and thus discounted) future consequences (this is called “time-
inconsistent discounting”).109 Thus, consumers may be more willing to 
provide personal data, such as location, gender, IP address and brand 
preference, in order to receive an application at no monetary cost in 
that very instant, even if they know this information may be sold to 
and used by third parties in intrusive manners at a later time. 
The costs and benefits are both tangible and intangible.110 One 
particular cost is the harm to privacy; whose measurement raises 
specific questions. First, privacy means different things to different 
people, as well as to different societies.111 Whether privacy is 
considered an inviolable human right or an economic good has an 
impact on the assessment of its “loss.” Second, the boundaries of 
 
 
 
 
106 Acquisti et al., supra note 85, at 3. 
107 Dinev & Hart, supra note 44, at 62. 
108 Acquisti et al., supra note 85, at 12-13. 
109 Alessandro Acquisti, Laura Brandimarte & George Loewenstein, Privacy and Human 
Behavior in the Age of Information, 347 SCI. 509, 510 (2015); Alessandro Acquisti, Privacy 
in Electronic Commerce and the Economics of Immediate Gratification, in PROC. IN 5 
INT’L CONF. ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 21-22 (2004). 
110 Acquisti et al., supra note 85, at 6. 
111 See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 479 (2006); 
Acquisti et al., supra note 85, at 1. 
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privacy harm can be both subjective (the perception of unwanted 
observation112) and objective (the unanticipated or coerced 
detrimental use of personal information113). It is difficult to generally 
quantify subjective privacy harm. Objective privacy harm, though 
easier to quantify, goes beyond the loss, which results from a 
monetary payment. When a transaction involves a payment in money, 
that money cannot be “used” against the individual at a later date. 
This is not the case for TPD. TPD is, by definition, related to a person. 
Its disclosure comes with risks of identity theft, fraud, and the 
divulgence of this information to third parties. Calculating this cost 
requires prior knowledge of the uses the data could be put to. There is 
a problem of information asymmetry. Consumers are rarely, if ever, 
completely aware about the purposes for which their data is being 
collected and the extent of third-party use.114 Third, the value of 
privacy to an individual varies on the circumstances in which that 
value is considered. An individual may value privacy more if 
specifically asked about privacy protection than when given the option 
to reduce it in exchange for benefits.115 
The majority of scholars agree that consumers’ concern for privacy 
is not absolute. Individuals are willing to exchange their personal data 
for economic benefits. Most individuals are privacy pragmatists, 
according to a Harris Interactive poll: while concerned about privacy, 
they will trade it for other benefits.116 Most research on consumers’ 
willingness to disclose information is survey-based, with a lesser 
amount of in-depth analytical research of consumers’ actual 
behavior.117 The lack of empirical evidence presented on the 
 
 
 
 
112 Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 131,133 (2011). 
113 Id. 
114 Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality in Individual Decision 
Making, 3 IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 26, 29 (2012); Dinev & Hart, supra note 44, at 64-65. 
115 Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 114, at 26-28. 
116 Harris Interactive, Most People Are ‘Privacy Pragmatists’ Who, While Concerned About 
Privacy, Will Sometimes Trade It Off for Other Benefits, Says Harris Interactive Study, 
PR NEWSWIRE (Mar. 19, 2003), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/most-people-
are-privacy-pragmatists-who-while-concerned-about-privacy-will-sometimes-trade-it-off-
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willingness to trade information for benefits is, according to Norberg, 
Horne, and Horne, due to a couple of challenges. First, privacy 
perceptions vary according to origin and age of the population as well 
as the type of information involved. Second, the diversity in 
measurements used by researchers has resulted in some confusion 
regarding the implications that can be drawn; some aim to measure 
privacy concerns, whereas others look at privacy-related behavioral 
intentions. Empirical research into actual disclosure behavior remains 
far more limited.118 Considerable academic attention has been devoted 
to a phenomenon commonly called the “privacy paradox,” i.e. the 
dichotomy between the expressed concern over privacy and actual 
disclosure behavior.119 Although individuals express significant 
concern about privacy in surveys, their actual disclosure behavior does 
not reflect this, as revealed in several studies120  
Surveys have indicated that consumers are willing to trade 
personal information for benefits. These surveys have been done by 
 
 
 
 
118 Patricia A. Norberg, Daniel R. Horne & David A. Horne, The Privacy Paradox: Personal 
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Commerce: Privacy Preferences versus Actual Behavior, 48 CACM 38, 38 (2005); 
Acquisti & Grossklags, supra note 114, at 26; Dinev & Hart, supra note 44, at 61. 
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both commercial and non-commercial entities.121 A PwC study 
revealed that an average of 73% of respondents would consider 
sharing information depending on the benefits they would receive in 
exchange. This seemed to hold even more for younger consumers (18-
29).122 According to Deloitte’s 2014 Report, nearly two-thirds of 
consumers would be willing to exchange their personal information 
for benefits, ranging from money savings to improved or personalized 
services.123 As early as 2000, Phelps, Nowak, and Ferrell concluded 
that catalogue shoppers’ purchase intentions are greater when 
shopping benefits or time savings are offered in exchange for 
information.124 Krause and Horvitz found that there is a willingness to 
share personal information in return for gains in efficiency in web 
search.125 In a questionnaire by Norberg, Horne, and Horne on self-
reported disclosure behavior, respondents were asked whether they 
would provide information to a large bank for a $20 incentive. The 
researchers found that the level of actual disclosure significantly 
exceeded individuals’ intentions to disclose.126 In addition to these 
surveys, a handful of research experiments performed in the last 20 
years revealed consumers’ willingness to provide personal information 
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in exchange for benefits. These benefits are operationalized as 
monetary rewards, future time savings, enhancement in quality, or 
personalization.127 In Spiekermann, Grossklags, and Berendt’s study 
into the privacy paradox, most participants did not live up to their 
self-reported privacy preferences.128 They displayed a surprising 
readiness to reveal highly personal information to an 
anthropomorphic 3-D online shopping bot. The study indicates that 
internet users do not act in accordance with their (self-reported) views 
on privacy. Given the right circumstances, online users forget about 
their privacy concerns and communicate even their most personal 
details. This holds true in particular when enticing benefits are 
offered.129 An experiment by Beresford, Kubler, and Preibusch tested 
consumer willingness to engage in an exchange of personal 
information for monetary benefits; however, they framed it as the 
unwillingness to pay for privacy rather than the willingness to provide 
data in exchange for benefits. In their test, subjects had the choice to 
purchase from one of two stores asking for their information. The test 
was framed in such a way that the first store was asking for more 
sensitive information. That store offered a lower price, and more 
individuals chose to buy from it.130 Grossklags and Acquisti also 
performed an experiment to test individuals’ willingness to sell or 
protect personal information. In the second phase of their experiment, 
the researchers gave the individuals (who had received $10 of game 
money) subsequent options of selling their personal information for 
revelation within the group of test subjects or paying to protect their 
information against such revelation. The researchers found that 
individuals almost always chose to sell their information and almost 
never to protect the information, even for as little a price as $0.25.131 
Whereas in this experiment individuals chose to sell their information 
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on weight even for as little as $0.25 - $1, in Huberman et. al’s 
experiment on the valuation of privacy, individuals had an average 
demand price of $74.06 dollars for weight information. This 
difference in valuation is probably due to the experiments’ set-ups as 
well as the difference in age range, with the average age in Grossklags 
and Acquisti’s test around 20 and in Huberman et. al’s test around 40 
years old.132 Nonetheless, it does show a certain willingness to 
exchange personal information for monetary benefits. 
The experiments revealed that the right commercial environment 
can induce a remarkable willingness to disclose personal information, 
which is often higher than what would be expected based on 
consumers’ self-reported privacy concerns. The promise of 
commercial benefits increases the readiness to provide personal 
information. None of these experiments, however, directly address the 
question of how consumers would behave if they were fully aware that 
they were engaging in some type of personal data trade for monetary 
incentives. So far as can be ascertained, extensive research on this 
question has not to date been published. In all of the studies cited, the 
purpose of the research (such as testing the privacy paradox or 
determining the value consumers attribute to personal information) 
was not communicated to participants up front in order to avoid 
priming. For our research purposes, however, it would be interesting 
to ascertain how consumers behave when they are completely aware 
that they are exchanging personal information for economic benefits, 
i.e. paying with TPD. If, in a situation of perfect knowledge of such an 
exchange, they would be willing to trade, the concept of TPD as a 
medium of exchange would be viable.  
The premise of this article is that, if undertaken, such studies 
would reveal that individuals are indeed willing to engage in such 
trade. Willingness to share personal data depends on a few criteria: 
the type of information, the characteristics of the party with whom the 
information is shared, the knowledge of how the information will be 
used, and personal preferences.133 It is also contingent on the expected 
returns and the environment in which the exchange takes place. 134 
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The privacy paradox and the notion of immediate gratification, 
discussed above, are important concepts. They imply that most people 
– even those who say they are concerned with privacy – will be willing 
to provide personal information, even for small rewards, if these 
rewards are immediate and thus seem to trump possible downsides 
such as loss of privacy.135 Indeed, perceptions and attitudes 
concerning information disclosure are changing. Privacy concern is 
adaptive and context-dependent.136 Human beings look for cues in 
their environment to make decisions, relying on cultural and context-
bound criteria, as well as the behavior of others. People acclimate to 
some level of intrusion when they become more common-place, as 
illustrated by an experiment in Helsinki on the installation of 
monitoring technology in households.137 The more prevailing the 
collection of data for “free” or discounted services becomes, the more 
likely it is that individuals will willingly engage in an exchange. 
Human beings are creatures of habit and society. As more human 
interaction moves to the Internet, where data collection is prevalent in 
both social and commercial exchange, the willingness to disclose is 
likely to increase. Trepte and Reinecke found that individuals who use 
social network sites (and thus gain social capital) show an increased 
tendency to self-disclose online.138 The more visible it becomes that 
online companies are engaging in data collection, the more normal it 
starts to become to frequent Internet users. This idea is reinforced by 
the evidence that younger people, who have spent a bigger portion of 
their lives on the Internet, are more likely to disclose personal 
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information.139 According to the 2014 Deloitte survey, consumers aged 
15-24 are more trusting of organizations collecting their personal 
information and more willing to exchange information for benefits.140  
3. Data Markets and Other Shifts to TPD 
Privacy perceptions are cultural and shifting. The prevailing 
approach in Europe, that privacy is an element of individual dignity 
and autonomy, is not universal. Different cultures have different views 
on what can be kept private and what is part of the public sphere. 
There are two main areas that can lead or stop this shift in perception: 
commerce and the law. The evolution of each with regards to personal 
data is discussed here.  
The increased use of commercial data-driven services has allowed 
the view of personal data as an economic asset to take root.141 With the 
Internet being a global phenomenon, privacy as a purely non-
commercial concept may be in decline. Discussions about property 
rights over personal data have emerged with both proponents and 
critics.142 Some authors have argued for the attribution to individuals 
of property rights over their personal data.143 A detailed discussion of 
the legal and philosophical grounds for a property right over personal 
data falls outside the scope of this research. For the purpose at hand, 
it suffices to acknowledge that such proposals have been put forward 
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and that the discussion is on-going. Indeed, property rights over data 
may be one way to bring consumers’ interests more in line with 
reality. Lanier argues, in his book Who Owns the Future?, for a system 
of commercial rights over personal data. He envisions a digital future 
in which individuals will derive benefits from allowing organizations 
to collect and use their data. This could be a solution to privacy 
concerns as “some people might choose more privacy and demand so 
much . . . as to make the use of their [photographs] prohibitive. Most 
people will choose some reasonable, conventional setting.”144 His view 
of the future ties in with the suggestion to create, or more precisely to 
expand, information markets where individuals can transfer the rights 
to their personal data to others in exchange for some type of 
compensation.145 Markets for data trade already exist at the level of 
business-to-business relations. Data brokers, such as Acxiom, 
Datalogix or Epsilon,146 facilitate the trade of personal data between 
companies. Now data trade is also expanding to include consumers 
directly. Start-ups are emerging that want to introduce individuals to 
the data trade from which they have until now been excluded. A new 
industry is growing, consisting of ‘Personal Information Management 
Services’ (PIMS) that enable individuals to manage their personal 
data, and use it to personalize services, make better informed 
decisions, or harness the economic benefits of the data trade.147 
‘Personal data lockers’ are giving individuals the ability to store their 
information in one place and control who they share that information 
with. Data lockers are a type of ‘data bank account,’ which could be 
part of a future ‘personal data ecosystem,’ as envisioned by the World 
Economic Forum.148 They allow individuals to store information and 
exchange it with others, in a manner similar to the storage and 
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exchange of money today. The concept of personal data lockers is still 
young and has sparked a series of intense debates.149 But while 
academics and policy-makers debate, some organizations have started 
making this vision a reality. They not only provide storage services, 
but also enable individuals to reap the profits of their personal data 
directly by exchanging TPD for economic benefits. Companies such as 
People.io150, HAT151, Citizenme152 and Datacoup153 have established 
such services.154 Datacoup, for example, provides software that 
extracts personal data from online activities with the user’s 
permission, and informs the user which information could be taken 
and the value it could have. The user indicates which personal data 
can be sold or exchanged and receives compensation for this 
exchange. Right now, Datacoup is still in its infancy, but as more 
companies join up as partners, this concept of consumer involvement 
in data exchange may gain traction. The benefits offered in exchange 
for personal data will not necessarily be limited to money either, with 
data purchasers being able to offer discounts or free goods in return 
for the TPD.155 People.io takes a slightly different approach, offering 
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its customers credits in exchange for their personal data, which 
customers can later redeem for offers or discounts on digital products 
or services.156 Both methods provide individuals with more control 
over their personal data, and an opportunity to reap the economic 
benefits of the data trade. 
In addition to the commercial developments, it is important to 
acknowledge the impact that future data regulation can have on 
company and consumer behaviour. The change in businesses’ and 
consumers’ perception of privacy can be influenced by the approach 
taken by regulators. In theory, regulation may even bring the currently 
thriving data-driven commerce to a halt. However, it seems unlikely 
that regulation will actively halt the collection of data, as this is a 
thriving business and current regulatory proposals would rather foster 
it, instead of nipping it in the bud.157 In a global industry reliant on 
data, it is more realistic to regulate the possible use of data after 
collection, than the collection itself.158 Data protection regulation can 
also have an impact on consumers’ involvement in the personal data 
economy.159 Regulators can choose to protect consumers, not by 
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putting a stop to data collection in general, but instead by empowering 
consumers through rights to better information and increased 
control.160 If such regulation is established and sensibly applied, 
increased transparency may emancipate consumers by informing 
them of the use and value of their data, the benefits they could reap in 
a personal data exchange, and their capacity to choose not to 
‘purchase’ certain services if the ‘price’ is too high. 
All of these developments indicate that the acceptability of TPD as 
a medium of exchange is not so far-fetched. If within part of the 
economy, both businesses and consumers engage in the trade of TPD 
for economic benefits – a fact which seems to become increasingly 
likely as time goes on and the industry develops – TPD will gain 
traction as a medium of exchange. This article puts forward a thought 
experiment for a future in which users are more actively involved in 
the data economy and are more sensitive to the amount asked of a 
specific medium of exchange: personal data. 
IV. PERSONAL DATA IN MARKET DEFINITION 
The conceptualization of personal data in this article has a specific, 
and limited purpose: to assess the potential of personal data as a 
measure of demand-side substitutability. Personal data need not 
become the currency of a whole economy; as long as users of specific 
online services consider that they are providing personal data in 
return for the service, the amount of TPD they are willing to provide 
could be used as an indication of their choices between products. If 
TPD is the medium of exchange for free online services, a new avenue 
to define markets for free online services is opened: an analysis of 
demand-side substitutability through the incorporation of TPD as the 
price. Market definition tests would no longer ask whether consumers 
switch to other products after an increase in monetary price – which 
the service does not charge – but after an increase in TPD. As a 
thought experiment, the next section will integrate TPD into the 
SSNIP test, and each step of the test will be discussed.  
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A. Preliminary Remarks 
Before the discussion of the SSNIP test with TPD, it is necessary to 
address some underlying assumptions which guide this thought 
experiment. This research concerns a relatively novel phenomenon. 
When working with a new and quickly evolving concept, it is 
important to be aware that future developments may impact the 
framework constructed around it. These developments cannot always 
be accurately predicted. This certainly holds true for the use of 
personal data by online services. Some developments are assumed as 
likely for the purpose of this article, such as the continued collection of 
personal data by online service providers. In addition, this article 
makes assumptions about the future reactions by companies, 
regulators, and consumers.  
First, this article works with the expectation that companies will 
act in accordance with data protection regulation, and that data 
protection regulation will not stifle the data economy. If properly 
drafted and enforced, regulation can increase the involvement of 
consumers in the data economy. The European Union’s General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR), which will come into force on the 25th 
of May 2018, imposes consent and information obligations on those 
companies acting as personal data controllers and processors, even 
when these companies are established outside of the EU, if they offer 
goods or services to individuals in the EU.161 If implemented correctly 
by the companies that fall within its scope, the GDPR grants 
consumers more insight and control over the collection of their 
personal data.  
Second, as discussed above, this article assumes that, as consumer 
involvement in the data economy increases, their familiarity with the 
commercial use of personal data will also increase. This would 
significantly reduce some of the challenges that currently arise from 
the use of TPD as price. One such challenge is that the amount of TPD 
asked as a price is not as easy to recognize as the amount of money 
asked. When consumers buy an apple in a supermarket, they know 
they will be paying $1 because it says so on the price tag. However, 
when the same consumers purchase services online, the amount of 
TPD gathered may not be as straightforward. As Strandburg puts it, 
“Internet users do not know the ‘prices’ they are paying.” Strandburg 
is right in arguing that consumers currently lack the extensive market 
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experience required for personal data to serve as a price and signal 
consumer demand.162 This would change, however, as they become 
more familiar with the use of TPD as a medium of exchange. Their 
ability to estimate the value of what they are exchanging would 
increase. Another challenge is that personal data is not purely 
economic, but also involves privacy concerns, even if emphasis on 
economic ‘control’ rights by consumers over their personal data 
grows. This does not, however, mean that personal data cannot be 
used as a price, to signal consumer demand for products. If enough 
information is available about the collected data, consumers will 
become able to compare services based on the amount of TPD they 
have to provide. The fact that consumers have a certain level of 
disinclination to allow intrusions of privacy may play a part in their 
consideration of what a reasonable price is. In any case, they would be 
able to choose whether they are willing to use service X or service Y, 
depending on the amount of TPD each requires. Thus, they would be 
able to signal their preferences for one service over another.  
Last, the article assumes that, as the data economy grows, and the 
participation of consumers in B2C exchanges increases, valuation 
methods for data will be refined and it will be possible to ascertain a 
B2C value of TPD. If this is not the case, the thought experiment set 
out in this article cannot hold. As discussed, the current valuation 
methods in use focus on B2B data trade or in-house valuations of data 
assets. However, with the growth of the PIMS and data locker market, 
the experience and evidence required to establish a B2C value of TPD 
becomes more readily available. Thus, it seems likely that, if more 
consumer-focused data companies emerge, the B2C valuation of TPD 
will be possible. This would then facilitate the use of personal data in 
the SSNIP test.  
The article will now address what a SSNIP test with TPD as a price 
could look like. It is important to remember throughout this 
discussion that this thought experiment only aims to assess the 
possibility of TPD as a price for market definition. It does not mean to 
assert the feasibility of personal data as a currency in the general 
economy. That would go beyond the scope of this article, which 
mainly seeks to provide an alternative method to assess demand-side 
substitutability for market definition. 
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B. Implementing the Test 
A SSNIP test with TPD as the price would involve asking the 
following question: ‘If the undertaking were to introduce a small but 
significant increase in the TPD required for the service, would 
customers switch to other services in a manner that makes this price 
increase unprofitable?’ The test would require three steps. First, a 
candidate market would have to be determined. Second, it would have 
to be assessed whether a small but significant non-transitory increase 
in the price (the TPD asked) would induce consumers to switch to 
other services, making the price increase unprofitable. Third, the 
market would have to be widened or maintained. If no switch takes 
place rendering the price increase unprofitable, the candidate market 
amounts to the right definition of the market and will not be widened. 
If the consumers do switch to other services, the candidate market will 
be widened, and the test repeated. The test can be repeated until the 
answer to the question is ‘no’ – an increase in price does not lead to an 
unprofitable switch by customers. These steps are the same regardless 
of whether the price of a service is rendered in money or TPD. 
However, there are practical implications of using TPD as the price for 
the test. In order to explore these, each step of the test will be 
discussed separately. A practical example will be used throughout this 
discussion. The SSNIP test will be applied to the hypothetical scenario 
that a case is brought regarding the behaviour of a company called 
FableVideo Ltd. This company offers an online service: video 
streaming within the Fantasy genre. FableVideo offers its services to 
its customers in ‘streams’ of video, which consist of 10 minutes of 
viewing time. Two other companies exist, which also offer video 
streaming, but of a general nature, without a specific genre focus. 
These are GeneralVideo Ltd. and AllVideo Ltd. Both FableVideo and 
GeneralVideo charge their customers in TPD, whereas AllVideo uses 
monetary prices. 
1. Increasing the Price 
The first step of the SSNIP test consists of choosing the candidate 
market to which the SSNIP test will be applied: that is, the smallest set 
of products, which will be assumed to be provided by the hypothetical 
monopolist. Usually the candidate market will consist of the products 
offered by the undertaking under review. In our example, an 
undertaking called FableVideo Ltd. offers a theme-specific streaming 
service that provides customers with streaming video within the 
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Fantasy genre. The candidate market is described as the Fantasy 
themed video streaming services. The hypothetical monopolist in the 
test would thus be the only one offering Fantasy themed video 
streaming. 
 
 
The second step raises interesting questions. In this new iteration 
of the test, not the amount of money, but the amount of TPD required 
to use the service would be increased, by a significant but non-
transitory amount. Then it would be assessed whether this increase 
would lead customers to choose another service, to such an extent that 
the increase would turn out to be unprofitable. In our example, the 
question would be whether consumers would switch to other 
streaming services if the hypothetical monopolist were to increase the 
TPD asked for 1 stream (a stream consisting of 10 minutes of video). 
Before it can be determined whether, and to which services, 
consumers switch, it is necessary to take a closer look at the price 
increase. The price increase in the SSNIP test must be ‘small but 
significant.’ The price increase must be sufficiently large to induce a 
response from customers,163 induce them to re-evaluate the purchase 
of the product against other options; but it cannot be so large that 
there is no other possibility than a large change in demand. On both 
sides of the Atlantic a 5-10% increase is generally considered small but 
significant, even though some jurisdictions allow for deviations if the 
factual circumstances call for it.164 In the case of TPD, it can be asked 
whether this somewhat arbitrary percentage can still be considered 
‘small but significant.’ It may be that individuals are less sensitive to 
increased demands of personal data than they would be to higher 
monetary prices. There is scope for further research here, which could, 
for example, derive conclusions on this question from past reactions 
to changes in privacy policies. Because such research has not yet been 
 
 
 
 
163 OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, MARKET DEFINITION: UNDERSTANDING COMPETITION LAW, 
2004, §§ 2.9, 3.3 (U.K.) (hereinafter OFT guideline); DOJ & FTC Merger Guidelines, supra 
note 17, at 10. 
164 ICN guidelines, supra note 4, at 11; EU Comm. Notice Market Definition, supra note 18, 
at §17; OFT guideline, supra note 163, at §2.9; DOJ and FTC Merger Guidelines, supra 
note 17, at 10. 
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done, this thought experiment proceeds with the traditional 5-10% 
increase. 
In addition, it is necessary to determine what constitutes an 
‘increase.’ An increase in the TPD demanded could be two-fold: it 
could refer simply to an increase in the amount of TPD demanded, or 
it could mean that the data will be used for additional purposes. The 
latter understanding is novel, and peculiar to the idea of TPD as price. 
Whereas an individual can only give and ‘use’ money once, TPD can be 
given repeatedly and for multiple purposes. The question is whether 
consumers are sensitive, not only to the amount of TPD demanded, 
but also to what is done with the data. Consumers may consider that 
‘the price is too high,’ for example, if data is no longer only sold to 
targeted advertisers, but also shared with third parties. This may be 
the case, in particular, when the third parties use the information for 
sensitive purposes, like StreetCheck, for example, which provides 
ethnic, cultural, and income information per street.165 If consumers 
would indeed change their behaviour if the data is used for additional 
purposes, this change in behaviour may signal demand-side 
substitutability. It is more straightforward, however, to apply a 
percentage to a number than to try to ‘significantly increase’ certain 
actions. The sensitivity to changes in use of data, and the degree to 
which this is quantifiable, is an avenue for further research. This 
thought experiment continues by considering a price increase as an 
increase in the amount of TPD demanded, not an increase in usage. 
However, even the application of a SSNIP to the amount of TPD is 
challenging. It requires the ability to divide data records into 
categories of equal value. The possibility of doing so depends largely 
on knowledge of the value of data, which is addressed in part III. To 
run this thought experiment, the valuations used in the example on 
page 25 will serve as a baseline. 166 
In our example, a hypothetical monopolist of Fantasy video 
streaming (like FableVideo) collects one record of TPD for each 
stream (10 minutes of video). The categories of TPD and their 
respective value are as follows: records on location, age, or brand 
 
 
 
 
165 STREETCHECK, https://www.streetcheck.co.uk [https://perma.cc/T65R-P8KY]. 
166 In part III it was put forward that companies offering data locker or personal 
information management services could lead the way to reaching a ‘B2C market price’ for 
certain categories of personal data. In that part of the paper, the value of certain categories 
of personal data was translated into credits, which equal certain discounts for consumers: 
Personal data record on customer’s phone brand was worth 10 credits, which had a value of 
$0.50.  
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preferences are each worth $0.50. Thus, if value of one stream is one 
record of TPD, the monetary value of that stream could be said to be 
$0.50. Let’s say that customers are paying for a 100-minute video (10 
streams): they would have to provide 10 TPD records (with a value of 
$5). A SSNIP of 10% would mean that customers have to provide one 
more TPD record. Thus, they would now have to provide 11 TPD 
records ($5.50) instead of 10 TPD records ($5). 
 
 
 
In the next step of the test, the reaction of customers to the price 
increase is gauged. If they switch to other services and render the 
price increase unprofitable, these will be included in the market. In 
our example, customers might switch from Fantasy video streaming to 
general video streaming services, which are offered by GeneralVideo 
and AllVideo. These companies’ prices are lower than FableVideo’s 
increased price. This can be understood in two ways: either the price 
is lower because less TPD is asked, or because the monetary price 
asked is less than the value of the TPD collected by FableVideo. 
In this case, GeneralVideo offers general video streaming for less TPD, 
and AllVideo provides general video streaming for a monetary price of 
lower value. This is an important distinction, particular to TPD. It is 
that companies offer similar online services, and that one company 
charges a monetary price, whereas the other collects TPD. Customers 
may feel that the TPD price is too high and prefer to pay a lower 
monetary price. Disregarding the companies who charge monetary 
prices would mean underestimating demand-side substitutability.  
 
If the price increase would be unprofitable because consumers 
switch to general video streaming services, such as offered by 
GeneralVideo and/or AllVideo, these services need to be included in 
the market. The market would thus be widened to consist of both 
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Fantasy themed video streaming and general video streaming. The 
next step would be to apply the SSNIP again, to this redefined market. 
If the SSNIP in this redefined market is still unprofitable, the test will 
be repeated. If it is no longer unprofitable, because insufficient 
consumers switch to other services, the relevant market has been 
found.  
 
 
2. Profitability and Monetary Value 
A question that arises is how to assess whether the increase would 
be unprofitable. A critical loss analysis could be performed. 
Determining the critical loss of the company enables the assessment 
of the profitability of the price increase. If the actual loss is greater 
than the critical loss, because consumers have switched, the increase 
is unprofitable. In our example, this means that although the profit 
per stream increases, the loss of output is still greater because fewer 
customers are obtaining FableVideo’s service. Performing the critical 
loss analysis when the price is in TPD has some interesting features. 
Applying a critical loss analysis when TPD is the price comes with a 
challenge. The calculation of critical loss requires knowledge of the 
revenue and gross margin of the company.167 Costs (which need to be 
known to calculate margin and revenue) such as the maintenance of 
the database, the collection costs, the personnel required and so on, 
are expressed in money. To know what the profit is per unit sold, it 
may be necessary to express TPD in its monetary value. If one unit is 
sold for 10 TPD and the variable costs are $2, then the unit margin 
will be 10 TPD minus $2. In addition, it is not easy to pinpoint what 
constitutes ‘revenue’ when the price is TPD. In B2C trade with a 
monetary price, the revenue is the amount of money earned from the 
provision of services to consumers. In business models where the 
service is offered in return for TPD, however, revenue could mean two 
things. Either the TPD itself is the revenue, or it is the money received 
for the sale or license of the TPD to a third party at a later stage that 
 
 
 
 
167 BISHOP & WALKER, supra note 20, at 552; O’DONOUGHUE & PADILLA, supra note 20, at 
111. 
2018] EBEN 277 
 
 
constitutes revenue. If the former is true and TPD itself is the revenue, 
much as money is in traditional trade, the revenue is assigned by the 
company at the moment it obtains the TPD. If the latter is true, the 
value is not assigned the moment the B2C transaction takes place, but 
at a later moment in time. In our example, the company was paid in 
10 TPD for the service, and then later sells the data on for $5. The 
revenue is the $5 received from the third party. Knowing how the 
company achieves its revenue is important. If the revenue is a 
consequence of trade with a third party at a later date, the value could 
be quite different than if the TPD itself is seen as the revenue. The 
company may not (or may take a long time to) realize the value of the 
TPD through trade with a third party. External elements may impede 
the second stage of the company’s business practice or shocks in the 
market may decrease the price the third party will be willing to pay. If 
the third party offers other goods or services in exchange for the TPD 
or the data-driven services offered by the company, the use of that 
transaction as a measure for the revenue may be quite difficult. The 
challenges in applying a critical loss analysis to TPD limit the use of 
this test to determine the profitability of the price increase. To address 
this limitation, TPD can, at least at an initial stage, be expressed in 
monetary value. In our example, the monetary value of 10 TPD is $5. 
Expressing TPD in monetary value would enable the calculation of 
profit per unit (10 TPD at $5, minus $2 in costs, for example), and it 
would facilitate the expression of the revenue derived from TPD. It 
may, however, undermine the full development of TPD as a medium 
of exchange if the go-to measure remains money. This is a drawback 
that should be acknowledged and may lead to the reformulation of the 
way to assess the profitability of price increases.  
Attributing monetary value to TPD is not just a matter for the 
critical loss analysis. In the hypothetical example of video streaming 
services, monetary value (B2C market value) was used as a proxy for 
the value of each TPD record. This facilitated setting out the thought 
experiment in a simple and comprehensible manner, in line with the 
current lack of inherent value recognition of TPD. However, if the use 
of TPD as a medium of exchange develops, consumers will 
automatically recognize TPD as valuable in itself. Services currently 
exist where the user is explicitly asked to accept advertising in return 
for the service. Zerocopy, for example, is a Belgian company enabling 
students to print their notes without monetary charge, but with ads.168 
A variation on this could exist, where companies explicitly ask for TPD 
 
 
 
 
168 ZEROCOPY, http://zerocopy.be/welcome [https://perma.cc/NF9G-CLAM]. 
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as a payment for an online service. This possible development was 
recognized recently in the EU’s proposal for a Directive on contracts 
for the supply of digital content. Recital 13 of that proposal states that 
“digital content is often supplied (…) against counter-performance 
other than money, i.e. by giving access to personal data.”169 As 
consumers become more familiar with explicit payments in TPD, they 
may think of the purchase of such services in terms of TPD, not 
money. The SSNIP test would not, then, require a conversion in 
money. It would suffice to increase the amount of TPD collected and 
monitor consumer reaction. Some types of TPD may be recognized as 
having the same inherent value, and thus be categorized in a similar 
way as in the FableVideo example. The TPD increase could happen 
within the same category of data collected or could consist of adding 
data from other categories to the collection. It is important to 
recognize that this is a hypothesis that has not (yet) come to fruition. 
It is a scenario with some apparent limitations, which would require 
further research. The question whether an increase in purposes should 
be considered would remain, as would the question as to how to 
measure profitability. The responses of consumers to TPD collected as 
a medium of exchange, and the attribution of value, also provide 
avenues for further studies.  
The use of monetary value as a proxy is not the only choice made 
in this article in order to facilitate the thought experiment. The 
example used has been kept relatively simple. It starts from the 
premise that the video streaming companies decide on the amount of 
TPD required, irrespective of consumer choices with regards to the 
use of the service. In reality, the amount of personal data collected by 
online companies may vary as a result of users’ choices in two ways. 
First, there are circumstances in which the user decides how much 
information to disclose. Indeed, when using social networking 
services, users can choose what to post and share with friends, the 
public, and the company. The question arises whether this disclosure 
can count as a price. The starting point should be that social 
information which is not monetized by the company, and not part of a 
conscious value exchange, is not TPD, and can thus not be deemed 
relevant to measure demand-side substitutability. 170 Second, users 
 
 
 
 
169 Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Certain Aspects Concerning Contracts for the Supply of Digital Content, COM (2015) 634 
final (Sept. 12, 2015).  
170 It seems useful to repeat that the personal data of concern is what has been called ‘TPD’, 
tradable personal data, which is part of a value exchange. 
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may have a degree of choice with regards to the level of service they 
purchase through their TPD. A service may require a minimum 
amount of TPD, which is a prerequisite for access to the most basic 
form of the service, whereas it requires more TPD to unlock access to 
more features of the service. For the purpose of this hypothesis, the 
types of data collected can be divided into: 1) TPD that a user needs to 
provide in exchange for access to the most basic form of the service, 
which can be called the ‘access price,’ 2) TPD that needs to be 
provided for the use of extra features of the services, to be called 
‘feature prices,’ and 3) TPD that users voluntarily share with other 
users of the service, which do not enable extra features. The access 
price is the minimum TPD required for the most rudimentary version 
of the service, used by all, such as person search in a social network. If 
in accessing more features, for example contact options or social 
recommendations, more TPD will be collected, the extra TPD amounts 
to a feature price. Not all users use all the features of the service, or 
the same features of the service, in a similar way as car shoppers do 
not purchase the same options on a car. The question arises as to 
which categories a SSNIP should be applied: the base price alone, the 
feature prices on their own, a combination of the base price and 
features, or all of these in a specific order. This question, which is 
closely related to the question how to distinguish features from 
products, will be the subject of further research subsequent to this 
article. 
V. CONCLUSION 
‘Free’ online services raise problems for market definition, as 
common methods to define the market rely on price to assess 
demand-side substitutability. If no price can be discerned, market 
definition becomes near impossible. However, ‘free’ does not 
necessarily mean that no ‘price’ is charged. Consumers on the Internet 
routinely act as providers of an important input: personal data. In 
exchange for the provision of their personal data, consumers obtain 
access to these ‘free’ services. This article argues that personal data 
could be the price in these transactions. Price is defined as the amount 
of medium of exchange paid in a transaction, and personal data could 
become that medium of exchange for online service. As users grow 
more aware that the collection of TPD is a condition for the use of 
online services, they become more sensitive to the amount of personal 
data demanded. They may then compare services based on the 
personal data demanded, enabling the assessment of demand-side 
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substitutability through consumers’ reactions to increases in the TPD 
demanded. This would open up a new way to define the market for 
online services in the absence of monetary price. This article hopes to 
spark a debate around the viability of this new approach by setting out 
a thought experiment on the viability of TPD as a ‘price’ for the 
purpose of market definition that is manifested through a rethinking 
of the SSNIP test, in which the ‘increase in (monetary) price’ is 
replaced by an ‘increase in TPD.’ 
The article first discussed the requirements TPD (tradable 
personal data) would have to satisfy to be a medium of exchange and 
thus a price. It is clear that the notion of TPD as a price is not without 
its challenges. Money may have benefits as a price that personal data 
does not. Money is an engrained part of society, accepted in the minds 
of both businesses and consumers as a medium of exchange. Its value 
is uniformly and inherently recognized by the economic participants. 
TPD may not have a similar status. However, it could be a price in 
some transactions if certain conditions are fulfilled. The further 
growth of awareness and acceptability is a prerequisite for the 
adoption of TPD as a price. The further development of technology, 
society, and regulation will play important roles in the viability of TPD 
as a means of exchange. From the outset, the willingness of consumers 
to exchange their personal data for benefits seems bigger than 
expected. Studies have revealed that concern for privacy is less 
significant than indicated by consumers’ self-revealed preferences. It 
seems likely that as consumer-oriented data-driven services increase, 
the awareness and sensitivity of consumers will also increase. If 
consumers are sensitive to demand of personal data for the use of 
services, TPD could be used as a price for the purposes of market 
definition for free online services. The article provided some thought 
on implementation of TPD in the SSNIP test. Some issues require 
further research, such as the sensitivity of consumers to increased 
data collection as opposed to higher monetary prices, which could 
prompt a re-evaluation of the 5-10% increased as the SSNIP 
benchmark. It would also be interesting to investigate whether users 
are sensitive to increases in the purposes for which data is collected. 
More pressing is the need to ascertain how to value TPD, and to 
increase the general knowledge of when and how much TPD is 
collected. This knowledge is also needed to assess whether TPD as 
price is a viable method for more complex settings, where the 
collection of personal data depends on the behaviour of users or varies 
depending on the form of the service used. This is research which can 
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only partially be done at this stage, as developments in the area may 
make imminent findings obsolete.  
It is clear that using personal data as a price for the purpose of 
market definition is not without its challenges. Nonetheless, the 
concept should not be too readily dismissed. Although the extent and 
speed of a future growth in awareness and habit will only reveal itself 
over time, TPD as a price provides an interesting alternative to fall 
back on when quantitative market definition turns out to be difficult 
because no monetary price is charged. Market definition is about the 
interchangeability of products: would consumers switch to another 
product? Using personal data as a price might answer that question. 
Research could investigate consumers’ responses to demands in 
personal data in real-life settings.171 Users of the App Store Google 
Play, for example, receive a warning of the type of personal data the 
app they are considering would collect. It might be interesting to 
analyze consumers’ reactions on the Google Play store to similar apps 
with different requirements in terms of personal data. If consumers 
are (or were to become more) sensitive to demand of personal data for 
the use of services, using personal data as a price for the purposes of 
market definition in the digital economy may be a viable option for 
market definition when there is no monetary price. The SSNIP test is 
not an exact science. It is an approximation of demand-side 
substitutability with the purpose of defining the market to eventually 
assess whether there is significant market power and anti-competitive 
effects. It should be used with caution. Currently, however, it is widely 
used on both sides of the Atlantic. It is not because one element of it 
(the existence of a ‘price’) seems daunting that it is time to throw the 
baby away with the bath water. Conceiving of personal data as a price 
may be a way forward. Above all, this article shows that innovation 
need not imply the demise of established legal principles. With some 
creative thinking law can be reimagined to fit within a changing 
society.
 
 
 
 
171 A recent draft paper is a step in that direction. In James C. Cooper, Anonymity, 
Autonomy, and the Collection of Personal Data: Measuring the Privacy Impact of 
Google’s 2012 Privacy Policy Change, Geo. Mason L. & Econ. Res. Paper Series 17-06 
(forthcoming) the author measured actual consumer response to determine whether they 
would reduce their use of Google for sensitive search queries as a result of changes in 
Google’s privacy policy. 
 
